The high cost of a
sisting of 100 interceptors based at Grand
cost $11 billion if based in Alaska and $9 bil-
Forks, North Dakota, would entail $14 billion
lion if based at Grand Forks.54 That estimate
layered system is
in acquisition costs.50 That estimate includes
was later increased to $13 billion.55 All of
not warranted.
the cost of the interceptors (using the Army's
DoD's more recent estimates are much high-
EKV), four new phased-array radars (one each
er than the CBO estimate of $14 billion for
in Grand Forks, Alaska, Hawaii, and New
100 interceptors based at Grand Forks and
England) to track incoming warheads, and
DoD's previous estimate of $10 billion for
the Space and Missile Tracking System
100 interceptors at an unspecified location
(SMTS)--that is, SBIRS--space-based sensors.
(both estimates were done in 1996).56 At least
CBO noted that the system would cost rough-
100 interceptors may be needed for protec-
ly $4 billion less if the Air Force's proposal for
tion against even small attacks.
an interceptor based on the existing Min-
Layered (Ground- and Space-Based)
uteman ICBM were adopted. This system
NMD
would be able to defend against an unsophis-
ticated attack of up to 20 warheads.
According to CBO, acquisition costs for an
CBO estimated that a system of 300 inter-
initial layered defense--consisting of 100
ceptors deployed at three sites would entail
ground-based interceptors, 500 space-based
$18 billion in acquisition costs (including
interceptors, and SMTS satellites--would be
SMTS).51 The larger system might provide
about $31 billion (including $3 billion to
hedge against technical risk).57 Such a layered
increased effectiveness (the ability to launch
more interceptors at an incoming warhead to
defense would be capable of protecting the
increase the probability of killing it) or the
United States from a more sophisticated
ability to defend against larger attacks (more
attack of up to 60 warheads accompanied by
than 20 warheads).
countermeasures.
After the release of the CBO report, ques-
A "high-end" layered defense--consisting of
tions were raised about whether basing inter-
300 ground-based interceptors, 500 space-
ceptors at Grand Forks could provide cover-
based interceptors, 20 space-based lasers, and
age of the entire country (instead of just the
SMTS satellites--would entail $60 billion in
lower 48 states). Defense Week reported: "The
acquisition costs (again, including $3 billion to
Pentagon has determined that interceptor
hedge against technical risk).58 Such a system
rockets for an initial, limited national missile
might be able to protect the United States
defense would best be located in central
against a more sophisticated threat--for exam-
Alaska."52 According to BMDO:
ple, up to 200 warheads accompanied by
sophisticated countermeasures.
CBO later revised its estimate for a layered
Shooting down what may be the most
defense to include the cost of operating and
likely near-term ICBM threats--a
supporting the system, which had been pur-
handful of relatively unsophisticated
posefully excluded earlier. According to CBO,
missiles, perhaps from North Korea,
operations and support (O&S) costs "would
Iraq or Iran--can most effectively be
be about $2 billion annually for the low-end
done from Alaska. . . . Alaska is the
system and about $4 billion annually for the
"optimum" spot to fire interceptors at
high-end system." Assuming a 20-year life for
such a limited, "simple" threat . . . no
an NMD system, the total cost of the low-end
matter where in the world the missiles
system would be $71 billion and the total cost
are launched from or where in the U.S.
of the high-end system would be $140 bil-
they are targeted.53
lion.59
In 1998, DoD--on the basis of data sup-
Clearly, a layered system including space-
plied by the contractor--estimated that acqui-
based weapons is expensive. Against rogue-
sition of a 20-interceptor deployment would
state ballistic missiles that do not have multi-
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