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Figure 4

Representative NMD System

Source: U.S. General Accounting Office, National Missile Defense: Even with Increased Funding Technical

and Schedule Risks Are High (Washington: GAO, June 1998), p. 3.

made in 2000 to achieve operational

tiate the ABM treaty to make such a deploy-

capability in another three years (by

ment possible.44 But, to lessen the technologi-

the end of 2003). . . . The overarching

cal risk to the NMD program, the Secretary of

goal of the "3 plus 3" program is to

Defense pushed back the date of deployment

remain within a three year window of

to as much as two years beyond the scheduled

deployment so that we can effectively

2003 date.45 This effectively stretched the "3

respond to an emerging threat.43

plus 3" program into a "3 plus 5" program.

The administration's program consists of

the following elements:

The Clinton administration recently

inched closer to making a decision to deploy

The Ground Based Interceptor (GBI);

an NMD system. Although the administra-

Upgraded Early Warning Radars

tion will not decide whether or not to deploy

(UEWR); Forward Deployed and/or

such a system until June 2000, it has added

U.S.-based X-band Radars (XBR); and

funding for procuring the system ($6.6 billion

Battle Management/Command, Con-

over the next six years) to its FY 2000 Future

trol and Communications (BM/C3).

Years Defense Plan. The administration has

The Space-Based Infrared System

also asked the Russian government to renego-

14