reentry vehicles with penetration aids as rudi-
afterthought. And the additional weight of
mentary as enclosing a balloon around a war-
any countermeasures may reduce the range of
head."38
the missile. The missiles that rogue states
In contrast, John Peller, Boeing's Vice Pres-
might develop are unlikely to have both the
ident and Program Manager for the NMD
capacity to carry countermeasures and the
system, is of the opinion that only sophisti-
range to strike the United States.
cated reentry vehicles using advanced pene-
The effective use of countermeasures
tration aids could defeat the NMD system. "It
therefore will present significant technical
will not be a simple penetration aid that gets
and operational obstacles for rogue states to
through the system."39 Peller contends that
overcome. And although more countries are
the optical discrimination of the NMD's
acquiring ballistic missiles (particularly long-
interceptor will allow it to combat a threat
range missiles), it is not clear that they are
that
pursuing or integrating countermeasure tech-
nology into the missiles.
encompasses the kind of capabilities
NMD Options
that Third World countries or rogue
states will be capable of when the ini-
None of the pro-
tial NMD architecture is deployed.
At a minimum, an NMD system would
posed NMD sys-
. . . This includes simple reentry vehi-
include (1) sensors--which can be space-
cles with little or no penetration aids.
and/or ground-based--to provide early-warn-
tems will be effec-
It also includes some of the simpler
ing of attacking missiles; (2) ground-based
tive against some
threats out of China.40
radars to identify and track warheads; (3)
delivery systems
ground-based interceptor missiles to destroy
incoming warheads; and (4) a battle manage-
But Peller also acknowledges that the initial
that rogue states
ment and command, control, and communi-
NMD system will not be capable against "a
already possess.
cations (BM/C3) system to control the sys-
more advanced threat with more sophisticat-
tem. Figure 4 depicts a representative NMD
ed penetration aids"--that is, Russian ICBMs
and SLBMs.41
system. Space-based interceptors and track-
ing sensors could also be part of an NMD sys-
The subject of countermeasures is very
tem to intercept enemy missiles earlier in their
technical, usually classified in nature, and
trajectory (in the boost phase, postboost
beyond the scope of this analysis.42 There are,
phase, and midcourse phases). The advantage
however, some important facts to understand
of intercepting missiles in those phases rather
about countermeasures. First, any NMD sys-
than the terminal phase is that debris and
tem will probably have at least two different
radiation from an exploding nuclear warhead
media for the detection and discrimination of
would not land on U.S. territory.
incoming warheads--radar and infrared (IR).
For the NMD system to be fooled, effective
Clinton Administration NMD Program
countermeasures would have to successfully
According to the Ballistic Missile Defense
simulate both the radar and IR signatures of a
Organization (BMDO), which oversees the
real warhead. Such sophisticated counter-
NMD program, the administration's pro-
measures are unlikely to be easily deployed by
gram known as the "3 plus 3" program is
rogue states of the Third World.
Second, the ability to deploy countermea-
designed to conduct three years of
sures is highly dependent on the size (payload
development and test activities, lead-
and throw weight) of the missile. There has to
ing up to an integrated system test of
be space to accommodate both warhead(s)
the NMD elements in Fiscal Year
and countermeasures. Thus, offensive missile
1999. If the threat at the time war-
systems must be designed with countermea-
rants, a decision to deploy could be
sures in mind--they cannot be added as an
13