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It would be fool-

"Although the launch of the Taepo Dong I as

also pose a threat. But we must understand

a missile was expected for some time, its use as

that long-range ballistic missiles will be just

ish and premature

a space launch vehicle with a third stage was

one of several possible threats.

to dismiss the

not."36 Walpole also noted that "a three-stage

None of the proposed NMD systems will

threat from rogue

configuration, with a light enough payload,

have a defensive capability against either

could well give North Korea the ability to

short-range ballistic missiles or cruise mis-

states out of hand.

send warheads across the Pacific."37

siles--delivery systems that rogue states or

Clearly, it would be foolish and premature

others already possess. Although hostile (and

to dismiss the threat from rogue states out of

potentially future hostile) nations are likely to

hand. The amount of time required by poten-

acquire long-range ICBMs that could be

tially hostile nations to develop and deploy

launched against the United States from their

long-range ballistic missiles capable of strik-

territories, those same nations probably

ing the United States may have been overesti-

already possess the means to strike the United

mated.

States in some other manner.

The multiplicity of threats does not mean

Limitations of NMD

that an NMD system must be able to defend

against virtually all threats--that is, long-

range ballistic missiles, short- or medium-

Of course, rogue states have or will have

range ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. It

options other than long-range ballistic mis-

would not be fair to require an NMD system

siles for striking the United States. Such

to be "one size fits all." The reality, however, is

countries already possess short- and medium-

that any NMD system will still leave the

range ballistic missiles that could be launched

United States vulnerable to other attacks.

from ships operating in international waters

If the U.S. government is serious about

off the U.S. coast. Rogue states also may pos-

providing protection for the United States

sess, or could acquire, cruise missiles, which

against rogue states and other menaces, it

could be launched from ships or possibly air-

must be willing to look beyond NMD to pro-

craft. Finally, terrorist attacks are an attractive

vide that protection. Otherwise, it must be

option available to rogue states (or groups

willing to accept continuing vulnerability to

they sponsor), especially given the open

those other threats.

nature of American society.

Such threats to the American homeland

Countermeasures

may be more acute than that posed by ICBMs

launched from rogue states. Even the most

hostile rogue state is likely to hesitate to

Countermeasures adopted by an adversary

launch an ICBM against the United States

(sometimes also referred to as decoys or pene-

from its territory; U.S. satellites can detect the

tration aids) also affect the potential efficacy

origin of such missile launches, and the

of NMD. Critics of NMD are usually quick to

world's most powerful nuclear force would

argue that the system could be easily fooled by

almost certainly retaliate in response to such

countermeasures, which would be cheap and

an attack. In contrast, the origin of terrorist

relatively easy to deploy. They contend that

attacks or missile launches from ships or air-

NMD interceptors would mistakenly attack

craft may be harder to determine, which

the decoys instead of the incoming enemy

makes U.S. retaliation--and therefore deter-

warheads (reentry vehicles). Richard Garwin,

rence--more difficult. The existence of the

a member of the Rumsfeld Commission,

other threats does not, of course, refute the

argues that "the NMD system under develop-

argument that long-range ballistic missiles

ment would be unable to successfully engage

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