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Two mistakes happened in rapid

pons. . . . By sharing such data, the

succession. First, Russian operators

USA wants to avoid incidents such as

mistakenly believed the scientific

when Russia in 1995 mistook a Nor-

rocket was a missile heading for

wegian rocket launch for a possible

Russian territory. Second, Russian

missile attack and put its nuclear

radars misinterpreted the separation

forces on alert.32

of the multiple rocket stages for an

attack by several missiles. This error

Although the agreement--if effectively

immediately raised the specter that

implemented--will reduce the chances of an

much of Moscow could be obliterat-

accidental launch from Russia, an unauthor-

ed in an American first strike.

ized launch is still possible. For example, a

The radar operators sent a mes-

coup could result in the splintering of the

sage through their chain of com-

Russian government or general staff, or a

mand warning of a possible U.S. nuc-

regional leader could seize control of strategic

lear attack that could strike Moscow

nuclear weapons on the territory of a particu-

within 15 minutes. When the mes-

lar region. The threat arising from such tur-

sage finally reached Russian Pres-

bulence should not be overstated, however.

ident Boris Yeltsin, he responded by

Leaders of splinter factions would have little

activating his "nuclear briefcase" for

incentive to launch a nuclear attack against

the first time ever in an emergency.29

the United States. Moreover, the potent U.S.

nuclear arsenal, poised for retaliation, is likely

to dissuade even a rabidly anti-American rene-

That incident was not the only near-acciden-

gade leader from such an attack.

tal launch by the Russians resulting from

Given the current state of the Chinese bal-

problems with their nuclear command-and-

listic missile forces, the prospect of a Chinese

control system. A similar incident occurred in

accidental or unauthorized launch is also rel-

1983. The Russian early-warning system is

atively unlikely. Not only is there less political

now in worse shape than it was then.30

instability in China, but Chinese missile fuel

Compounding the problem is that both

and warheads are stored separately from their

U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on high

missiles.33 That safeguard makes an accidental

alert. According to Bruce Blair from the

Brookings Institution:

launch virtually impossible.

Therefore, because accidental or unautho-

The close coupling of two arsenals

rized launches from either Russia or China

geared for rapid response carries the

seem to pose an unlikely threat and because

Accidental or

inherent danger of producing a mis-

developing a more sophisticated NMD sys-

unauthorized

taken launch and an escalating volley

tem to counter larger launches of that genre is

launches from

of missiles in return. The possibility

very expensive, such scenarios should not

of such an apocalyptic accident can-

weigh heavily in the design and deployment

either Russia or

not be ruled out even under normal

of an NMD system. Also, planning to build a

China seem to

conditions.31

large and sophisticated NMD system to

pose an unlikely

counter larger accidental or unauthorized

launches could doom any chances of a cordial

Fortunately, the prospect of a Russian acci-

threat.

renegotiation of the ABM treaty and might

dental launch may now be made less likely.

even jeopardize nuclear stability between the

According to Jane's Defence Weekly, Presidents

United States and Russia.

Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin

Missile Threat from Rogue States

formally agreed to share early-warn-

The threat that seems to be driving the

ing data on missile launches to re-

hurried campaign to deploy an NMD system

duce the chance of miscalculation or

is the ballistic missile threat from "irrational"

the accidental launch of nuclear wea-

9