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It seems unwise

Russian strategic arsenal would have been

launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). That

undermined--while permitting systems to

threat was massive in size (in numbers of

to assume that

protect against threats from rogue states and

both launchers and warheads), technological

NMD is not need-

accidental or unauthorized launches by the

sophistication (MIRVs and decoys), and oper-

ed.

major nuclear powers.15 The Russian receptiv-

ational complexity (times of flight, ranges,

ity to renegotiation was especially interesting

and trajectories).

because GPALS was a more ambitious defense

The Flawed 1995 National Intelligence

than anything the Clinton administration

Estimate

has proposed.

A reasonable argument can be made that a

The current threat arising from the prolif-

limited NMD system (for example, a hundred

eration of missile technology to rogue states is

or a few hundred ground-based interceptors)

more uncertain. According to the November

designed to defend against limited threats

1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),

from rogue states would not enable the

"No country, other than the major declared

United States to undermine nuclear stability

nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise

by threatening Russia's second-strike capabil-

acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years

ity. That is, the United States would not be

that could threaten the contiguous 48 states

able to launch a preemptive nuclear first

and Canada."16 Interestingly, however, the

strike and have sufficient defensive capability

NIE acknowledges that the Taepo Dong 2

to negate a Russian retaliatory strike. Even at

missile being developed by North Korea will

the lower levels of offensive weapons under

have sufficient range to strike "portions of

START II, a few hundred NMD interceptors

Alaska and the far western portion of the

that could only intercept tens of warheads are

Hawaiian Island chain."17

unlikely to be able to significantly degrade a

The NIE has been the target of severe criti-

Russian attack consisting of hundreds or

cism. The General Accounting Office (GAO)

thousands of warheads. And Russia's finan-

noted that the NIE's main conclusion--that

cial problems make it unlikely that it could

no additional country will acquire a ballistic

augment its arsenal of offensive weapons to

missile in the next 15 years that could threat-

offset U.S. deployment of a limited NMD.

en the continental United States--"was word-

Furthermore, the option of negotiated,

ed with clear (100 percent) certainty."18 GAO

mutual deployments of NMD by both the

criticized that conclusion as "overstated."19

United States and Russia could allow any per-

Similarly, former Central Intelligence Agen-

ceived advantages of ballistic missile defense

cy (CIA) director James Woolsey has argued

to be mutual. That option might also involve

that formulating U.S. defense policy based on

the sharing of U.S. missile defense technology

the NIE conclusions would be "a serious

with Russia. If the Russians resolutely refused

error."20 In particular, he criticized the NIE's

to negotiate a new version of the ABM treaty,

focus on the continental United States to the

the United States would need to abrogate it.

exclusion of Alaska and Hawaii. He contend-

ed that this frame of reference "can lead to a

The Ballistic Missile Threat

badly distorted and minimized perception of

to the United States

the serious threats that we face from ballistic

missiles now and in the near future."21

During the Cold War, the threat to the

The Rumsfeld Commission Critique

United States from ballistic missiles was well

defined and well understood: Soviet land-

The Rumsfeld Commission, a congres-

based ICBMs--especially those that carried up

sionally mandated panel chaired by former

to 14 multiple independently targeted reentry

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that

vehicles (MIRVs)--and sea-based submarine-

independently assessed the threat to the

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