Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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mutual assured destruction, under
START II, if Russia can maintain its Triad of
which, for better or worse, the origi-
strategic offensive and defensive forces, it will
nal logic of the ABM treaty continues
become the preeminent nuclear superpow-
to hold.9
er."12 (START II is the Strategic Arms Reduc-
tion Talks II Treaty, which limits the number
of strategic offensive warheads that Russia
On September 26, 1997, the Clinton
and the United States possess to between
administration declared its continued sup-
3,000 and 3,500 each.)
port for the ABM treaty when the White
House signed a memorandum of understand-
Renegotiate or Abrogate the ABM treaty
ing that named Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia,
In the final analysis, U.S. leaders should
and Ukraine as successor states to the Soviet
not permit the ABM treaty to be an insur-
Union for the purposes of the treaty.
mountable obstacle to NMD, if such a system
Critics of the ABM treaty argue that the
can be shown to be in the best interest of U.S.
treaty is no longer binding because the Soviet
security and to be cost-effective. Unlike the
Union no longer exists and because the
Constitution, the ABM treaty--or any treaty--
Soviets were, and the Russians continue to be,
should not be considered a cornerstone of
in violation of the treaty. They contend that
America's political institutions and way of
the Russians have more than the one ABM
life. A treaty should be retained only as long
system permitted by the treaty. Joseph
as it serves the security interests of the
Arminio, chairman of the National Coalition
American people. As Ted Galen Carpenter,
for Defense, states:
the Cato Institute's vice president for foreign
policy studies, stated: "Such commitments
Not only did the U.S.S.R., unlike the
may make sense at the time they're created,
U.S., deploy the one missile defense
but make little sense--and may even under-
permitted by the treaty, ringing
mine important American interests--when
Moscow with the 100 interceptors
conditions change."13
sanctioned by law. It also littered
about Soviet territory with another
Concerns about stability and deterrence
10,000 to 12,000 interceptors, and 18
vis-à-vis Russia are legitimate and cannot be
battle-management radars. Together
ignored. But those concerns could be
the Moscow defense and the vast
addressed by negotiation of a new version of
homeland defense formed an inter-
the ABM treaty, or mutual abrogation of the
locking system--nearly all of it illicit.10
treaty, rather than by a unilateral withdrawal
U.S. leaders
by the United States. In fact, the Clinton
administration recently asked Russia to rene-
The "10,000 to 12,000 interceptors" to which
should not permit
gotiate the treaty to allow a limited NMD sys-
Arminio refers are SA-5, SA-10, and SA-12
the ABM treaty to
tem.14
anti-aircraft missiles that some ABM treaty
opponents argue have an anti-ballistic missile
Before the Bush administration's electoral
be an insurmount-
capability.11
defeat in 1992, it was making substantial
able obstacle to
progress in renegotiating the ABM treaty to
Although supporters of the ABM treaty
NMD.
win Russian acceptance of its Global
view the treaty as a cornerstone of nuclear sta-
Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS)
bility and deterrence, the treaty's critics
system (space-based anti-ballistic missile sen-
believe that it upsets stability. William T. Lee,
sors and weapons and ground-based intercep-
a former Defense Intelligence Agency officer,
tors). Any renegotiation would have retained
argues: "Given the relatively small number of
the basic aim of the ABM treaty--limiting
U.S. missile and bomber warheads likely to
defenses so that neither the U.S. nor the
survive a Russian preemptive strike under
4