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most acceptable solution both politically and technically

is to pursue a test ban with two key features: it would

enable the United States to conduct testing at yields suf-

ficient to ensure the safety and reliability of its

nuclear weapons, and it would be effectively verifiable.

The CTBT pursued by all presidents before President

Clinton included both of those features.  Past U.S. nego-

tiating positions on the CTBT allowed for so-called per-

mitted experiments, that is, very low-yield tests below

the detection level.  Past presidents' negotiating posi-

tions on the CTBT required that only those tests that

could be detected with high confidence be disallowed under

a test ban.

Some observers may believe that the Senate should

simply not act on the CTBT.  That is unwise because it

allows the state of limbo--not testing--to continue eroding

confidence in the reliability and safety of U.S. nuclear

weapons.  It also allows continuing deterioration of U.S.

capabilities across an array of specializations--nuclear

weapons design, engineering, computer code development,

testing, and materials science.

Conclusion

The first of two principal arguments for CTBT ratifi-

cation is that the treaty will be a step toward total

nuclear disarmament because it will constrain the modern-

ization and development of nuclear weapons.  The second

argument is that the CTBT will stem nuclear proliferation.

While it is true that modernization and development will

be constrained, some opponents of the treaty view that as

a negative outcome for the United States.  Further, they

fear that other nations may continue to modernize and

develop nuclear weapons despite the treaty because CTBT

verification measures will not likely detect evasive test-

ing.  The notion that the CTBT will stem proliferation is

clearly untrue.  Nations can acquire workable nuclear

arsenals without testing.

The substitutes for testing devised by the Clinton

administration may not be successful.  The SSP is politi-

cally and technologically risky, and the money is by no

means guaranteed.  Maintenance of the capability to resume

underground testing quickly is not possible absent testing.

The nuclear weapons production complex is not fully func-

tional and must be rebuilt.

In conclusion, the limited political benefits of the

CTBT are not worth the high cost to U.S. national securi-