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willing to spend tax dollars to ensure that U.S. nuclear

weapons are reliable.

In the poll, respondents were asked how important it

is for the United States to retain nuclear weapons today.

A majority, 73 percent, believe it is important.  Of those

who believe it is important to retain nuclear weapons, 30

percent said that it is extremely important.

One of the best ways to determine the degree of pub-

lic support for an idea is to inquire whether people would

be willing to spend money on it.  Thus, the poll asked

whether respondents thought that the government should

increase, decrease, or keep the same the amount of spend-

ing to maintain nuclear weapons in reliable condition.

Fifty-seven percent of the respondents advocated increased

spending, 15 percent would keep spending the same, and 28

percent would decrease spending.

The poll also found that the public does not support

nuclear testing.  One question asked how respondents felt

about the United States participating in a treaty that

bans all nuclear test explosions.  Seventy-three percent

supported such a treaty, 7 percent were unsure, and 21

percent opposed it.

The questions in the poll did not inform respondents

of details about the CTBT.  For example, the respondents

were not told that the treaty would be unverifiable or

that confidence in the reliability of the U.S. stockpile

would decline without testing.  If such information were

provided to the public, it would probably substantially

increase opposition to the CTBT.

If the United States were to reject the CTBT and

resume nuclear testing, the opposition from anti-nuclear

activists would be extremely strong.  Thus, before testing

is resumed--if indeed that option is chosen--it is impera-

tive that the public be better infomed on the relationship

between testing and retaining a strong nuclear deterrent.

An Alternative

From a purely technical standpoint, it would be most

prudent for the U.S. Senate to reject the CTBT and to

allocate funds for resumption of U.S. testing and for

reconstruction of the U.S. nuclear weapons production

infrastructure.  However, it may be politically desirable

to undertake some limitations on testing.  The question

is, What specific measure should be taken?  Perhaps the