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treaty, and some officials within the U.S. government as

well, believe that the object and purpose of the CTBT is

to help achieve total nuclear disarmament.  Their view is

bolstered by several sentences in the CTBT preamble stat-

ing that the goal of a test ban is nuclear disarmament.

Therefore, it is possible that the Executive Council will

use its authority to pursue additional steps toward disar-

mament, including measures unrelated to nuclear testing.

By funding the CTBT organization, the United States would

be financing an international bureaucracy with a charter

that includes responsibility for pressuring the United

States to give up its nuclear deterrent.

If a majority of the Executive Council undertakes to

"negotiate" additional nuclear disarmament measures, it

will be assisted in its efforts by a third extraordinary

power granted the council by the CTBT: the power to order

all treaty parties to convene.  Thus, the Executive

Council can call conferences, for example, to consider

resolutions or actions in support of nuclear disarmament.

Only a two-thirds majority of the treaty parties present

and voting would be required to act on the Executive

Council's proposals.

The likelihood that the Executive Council will engage

in activities not directly related to the implementation

of verification measures is increased by the fact that it

is a permanent body.  Unless there are frequent accusa-

tions that nuclear tests are being conducted, there will

be little for the Executive Council to do once the

International Monitoring System is set up.  International

bureaucrats, most of whom will be strong supporters of

disarmament, may be inclined to seek new ways to use the

powers of the Executive Council to pursue their objec-

tives.

In summary, the CTBT is more than a simple ban on

nuclear testing.  Its bureaucracy and charter create the

option for continuing pressure and action on behalf of the

goal of nuclear disarmament.  Yet nuclear disarmament is

not a goal that the American public supports.

The American Public Supports Both the

U.S. Nuclear Deterrent and a CTBT

The University of New Mexico Institute for Public

Policy conducted a nationwide, objective poll in 1997 to

probe U.S. public perceptions on a variety of nuclear-

related issues.26   One of the key findings is that the U.S.

public strongly supports the U.S. nuclear deterrent and is