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Clinton administration's CTBT is a multilateral treaty

involving more than 150 nations.  As such, it entails a

very large UN-style multinational bureaucracy and ascribes

significantly more power to that bureaucracy than was

envisioned in previous U.S. presidents' versions of a test

ban.  For example, the Clinton administration's CTBT cre-

ates an executive council with extensive and extraordinary

powers.

The Executive Council comprises 51 member states, each

of which is elected to the council by the Conference of

All the States Parties (all states that are party to the

treaty).  Seats on the council are allocated by region--10

from Africa, 7 from Eastern Europe, 9 from Latin America

and the Caribbean, 7 from the Middle East and South Asia,

8 from Southeast and East Asia, and 10 from North America

and Western Europe.  The treaty does not guarantee the

United States a seat.  Conceivably unforeseen political

events may someday deny U.S. representation.23   Decisions

of the council require a two-thirds majority for matters

of substance; procedural issues require a simple majority.

One of the most extraordinary powers of the Executive

Council is its charter to conclude and supervise implemen-

tation of agreements or arrangements with states that are

parties, other states, and international organizations.

The council may unilaterally conclude agreements or

arrangements that relate to verification; all others must

be made with the prior approval of the Conference of All

the States Parties.

Although two words are used--"agreements" and

"arrangements"--the Clinton administration has stated that

the functionality of the two words is the same.24   Both

words are used because "agreements" are legally binding

conclusions that, in the case of the United States, might

very well need congressional approval.  An "arrangement"

would probably not be submitted for approval, but under

this treaty, the United States would still be bound by it.

The danger exists that the Executive Council may use

its power to conclude arrangements that have significant

political or economic repercussions, or both, and that

would legally bind the United States--all without the

approval of the U.S. Congress.  Providing such power to an

international organization is unprecedented.

Another potentially controversial power given by the

CTBT to the Executive Council is the responsibility to

recommend proposals for "promoting the object and purpose

of this treaty."25   Most nations that have signed the