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portrayed the CTBT as a step toward disarmament, saying

that it would halt vertical proliferation--the improvement

of nuclear arsenals by those states that possess them.

Most NPT parties have been led to believe that the United

States and other nuclear weapons states would be unable to

test under a CTBT.  This prohibition would erode confi-

dence in the reliability of the nuclear stockpile and,

ultimately, make the use of such weapons less likely.  The

Geneva negotiating record makes it clear that other

nations have been convinced that the CTBT is a step in the

process by which the United States and other nations will

abandon nuclear deterrence and reduce nuclear stockpiles to

zero.

The truth, however, is that the United States has no

intention of giving up its nuclear weapons and has the

stated policy of retaining them for as long as it is in

U.S. security interests to do so.  The United States and

other nuclear weapons states are establishing programs

designed to ensure that their stockpiles will remain safe

and reliable--and therefore usable--despite the testing

ban.  Thus, "nuclear erosion," the goal set for a CTBT by

many nations around the world, is effectively undermined

by a successful SSP.  As a result, many nations and non-

governmental groups have already declared that the CTBT

does little or nothing to fulfill the NPT article VI obli-

gation to abandon nuclear deterrence and reduce nuclear

stockpiles to zero.  Because non-nuclear-weapons states are

likely to perceive that the CTBT is not the disarmament

measure they anticipated, they probably will try to use

the threat of unraveling the NPT as leverage to terminate

the SSP and equivalent programs in Russia, China, France,

and the United Kingdom.  Already, for example, Japan has

called for new discussions to focus on terminating zero-

yield experiments--the type of experiments that is integral

to the SSP.

The willingness of some NPT parties to use that

treaty as an expendable tool is influenced by the decline

in relevance of the NPT to nations' sense of security.

The decline has nothing to do with the presence or absence

of nuclear testing by the first five nuclear weapons

states.22   Rather, the NPT's diminished significance stems

from a host of other phenomena such as the violations of

the NPT by North Korea and Iraq, the spread of chemical

and biological weapons, growth in missile proliferation,

and the nuclear weapons capabilities of nations not party

to the NPT--Israel, India, and Pakistan.  Those factors

will continue to erode the relevance of the NPT, regard-

less of whether there is a CTBT.