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By comparison, proliferators are likely to target

cities, not silos.  Their delivery vehicles may be ships,

barges, trucks, or Scud-type missiles.  Proliferators may

not care whether they obtain an exact yield, may not face

the tight restrictions imposed by advanced delivery systems

or safety standards, are unlikely to use highly complex

designs, and may not care about weapons' effects on equip-

ment.  Furthermore, proliferators may have an entirely

different standard for reliability.  In other words, a

nation may quite feasibly develop devices that will work,

as long as knowing the exact yield does not matter and no

exacting specifications are required.

In summary, the CTBT will not create a significant or

meaningful obstacle to nuclear proliferation.  A nation

may quite feasibly design, build, and stockpile effective

nuclear weapons without nuclear testing.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Is at Risk,

Regardless of a CTBT

The Clinton administration argues that U.S. ratifica-

tion of the CTBT is essential to ensure extension of the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)--a treaty to prevent

the spread of nuclear weapons--when the NPT is next

reviewed by its parties in 2000.  In reality, NPT parties

will not be satisfied with CTBT ratification.  The NPT

conference in 2000 will be highly contentious, regardless

of CTBT ratification, because the CTBT has been falsely

represented as a commitment to nuclear disarmament.  Some

background on the NPT-CTBT linkage is necessary to under-

stand why.

There has long been a conflict between two sets of

nations that are party to the NPT--those that have nuclear

weapons and those that do not.  The latter group has con-

tended that the nuclear weapons states are not fulfilling

their treaty obligation, contained in article VI of the

NPT, to work in good faith toward total nuclear disarma-

ment.  Increasingly, the nonnuclear states have demanded

concrete steps toward zero nuclear weapons, as well as a

timetable according to which disarmament will be achieved.

The nuclear weapons states, however, have refused to give

up nuclear weapons and have argued that disarmament is a

long-term rather than a near-term goal.

By advocating a CTBT, the United States has sought to

satisfy the demands for disarmament while continuing to

rely on nuclear deterrence.  During negotiations at the

Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, U.S. representatives