<<  <  >  >>

Page 20

States because the need for new or different nuclear

weapons may evolve and because today's verification tech-

nology cannot give us high confidence that other nations

will not cheat.  Furthermore, the safeguards designed to

enable the United States to retain its nuclear weapons

design and testing capabilities are extremely risky.

The following sections will address the second princi-

pal argument on behalf of the CTBT--that it will constrain

the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

The notions that the treaty will help "save" the Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty and will create an international

norm against nuclear testing will also be addressed.

The CTBT Does Little or Nothing to Prevent Nuclear

Proliferation

A proliferator may want to test its nuclear weapons

for political reasons, as India and, particularly, Pakistan

did in 1998.  However, nuclear testing is not a prerequi-

site to acquiring a workable, reliable arsenal.  It is

well known that some single-stage fission designs are rel-

atively simple and that nations would not need to test

them to have sufficiently high confidence that they will

work.  The bomb dropped on Hiroshima was a design that had

never been tested.  South Africa built six nuclear weapons

without testing.

Furthermore, the CTBT would not confine new prolifera-

tors to simple designs.  Today, without testing, relative-

ly sophisticated weapons (nonboosted, implosion-type

devices) may also be designed with high confidence.  The

level of complexity of the nuclear design that can be

attained without testing depends on the technological

sophistication of the nation concerned and on that

nation's access to foreign nuclear weapons expertise.

The technical need for testing increases with the

complexity and performance requirements of the nuclear

weapon.  The United States and Russia have focused on the

ability to strike one another's military sites--which

entails pinpoint accuracy against small targets such as

silos--rather than larger targets such as cities.  That

emphasis dictates the need for high-performance delivery

systems, which, in turn, require tight parameters on

allowable weight, size, shape, safety measures, and yield.

In addition, U.S. and Russian interest in the destructive

effects of warheads on military equipment is high.21   And

both nations have high standards for the reliability of

their weapons.