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ban could and would be extended only if it could be proven

that testing was unnecessary for the security of the

United States.  Thus, the onus would be on test ban propo-

nents to prove that the ban should continue.  In contrast,

the unlimited duration of the Clinton CTBT requires test-

ing advocates to prove that the treaty should be abro-

gated.

The implications of unlimited duration are many, but

the most important is that it will be extremely difficult

politically to resume testing--even if it appears warranted

from a technical standpoint.  Abrogating the CTBT would

likely bring on more negative reactions from the interna-

tional community than would refusing to ratify the treaty.

In addition, President Clinton set an extraordinarily dif-

ficult standard that must be met before the United States

would resume testing under the CTBT (safeguard F).

For a host of reasons, a decision to resume testing

would not likely ever be made under the conditions set

forth in safeguard F.  Several people with differing

motives and perspectives must agree to undertake a con-

tentious action.  They must agree that there is a problem,

that it must be fixed, how it is to be fixed, and whether

a test is vital to ensuring that the remedy works.  "High

level of confidence" cannot be defined, so there will

always be grounds for disagreement over the importance of

testing.  And, the critical phrase, "of a nuclear weapon

type which the Secretaries consider to be critical to our

nuclear deterrent," offers an escape.  There are nine

designs in the enduring U.S. arsenal, each of which has

unique characteristics.  Despite the need to maintain the

diversity of U.S. weapon types, a decision to retire the

weapons of any design that develops a problem--by labeling

that design as not critical to the deterrent--would be

politically easier to make than the difficult decision to

break a test ban.

Even those who would wish to fix any problems that

develop with U.S. weapons may hesitate to break a test ban

once it is in place.  They might be legitimately concerned

that taking such a drastic action as treaty abrogation

would send a dangerous signal to adversaries that the

problems with the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile were

extremely serious.  That action could signal weakness and

invite aggression.

The above sections address the first argument on

behalf of the CTBT--that it will constrain the development

and modernization of nuclear weapons.  The conclusion here

is that such constraint is disadvantageous to the United