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understood than one for a diverse set of projects to

develop diagnostic tools.

· The SSP is designed to address research and devel-

opment needs; it does not include a program for

rebuilding U.S. nuclear weapons.  The U.S. nuclear

weapons production complex must itself be rebuilt and

validated--a lengthy, costly process.

· Support from the arms control community for the SSP

is lukewarm at best.  Many advocates of the CTBT say

that they will reconsider their support for the SSP

in the future--after the CTBT is ratified.

· SSP managers are likely to limit the types of

experiments they are willing to undertake because of

fear of adverse reaction from anti-nuclear activists.

This could make the SSP less relevant to nuclear

weapons design.

· The credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent may

erode regardless of the SSP's success because the

reliability and viability of the U.S. arsenal will

not be demonstrated regularly.

In summary, SSP--as a "substitute" for testing--faces

serious challenges and may fail.

The Capability to Test Quickly Cannot Be

Maintained under the CTBT

The directors of the two U.S. nuclear weapons labora-

tories gave their support to a test ban conditioned on two

criteria: a fully funded SSP and the ability to test if

there were a need to do so.  President Clinton's safeguard

F allows for making the political decision to test, and

safeguard C requires maintaining the capability to test.

In the absence of testing, however, the capabilities to

test cannot be maintained.  In addition, safeguard F sets

an enormously difficult standard to be met before a test

can proceed.

The ability to test requires more than just having a

test site.  It requires people with high levels of exper-

tise and specialized skills, as well as unique and complex

equipment.  As Hecker has stated,

Merely preserving facilities and support infra-

structure at NTS [the Nevada Test Site] will not

provide readiness.  In spite of our best