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clause" in order to conduct whatever testing

might be required.

The safeguards establish a Stockpile Stewardship

Program (SSP) to enhance confidence in the reliability and

safety of U.S. nuclear weapons in the absence of testing,

as well as a program for research on verification meas-

ures.  The United States must maintain the capability to

conduct a nuclear test, and in case SSP does not work, an

"escape clause" exists for withdrawal from the treaty if a

test is needed.  There are major problems with the safe-

guards, and they may not work.

Success of the SSP Is Highly Uncertain

The Clinton administration's SSP will attempt to

attract and train weapons scientists and to conduct

research that will increase understanding of nuclear

weapons physics and phenomena.  Administration officials

hope that this understanding, when coupled with advanced

computational capabilities and nonnuclear testing, will be

sufficient to ensure high confidence in the reliability of

the U.S. stockpile.  They also hope that these capabili-

ties will enable the United States to modernize its stock-

pile, should new designs be required.18

CTBT opponents are unwilling to bet U.S. national

security on the possibility that the SSP might succeed as

a replacement for nuclear testing.  They point out a num-

ber of weakness associated with the planned SSP, including

the following:

· The technologies of the SSP are unproven.  There is

no certainty that those technologies will work as

intended or that the SSP will enable scientists to

understand weapons physics well enough to replace the

knowledge previously gained through testing.

· The SSP facilities will not be completed for a

decade, perhaps longer.  In the interim, the stock-

pile could erode seriously because the United States

would have inadequate capabilities to detect and fix

the problems that arise.

· The funding for the program, $4.5 billion per year

for 10 years, will be highly controversial.  The sum

must be defended in light of other pressing priori-

ties and annually agreed to by Congress.  A budget

for testing weapons is likely to be much more readily