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cation deficiencies.  To address those problems, President

Clinton announced a series of so-called safeguards.

The White House stated in August 1995 that its sup-

port of the CTBT is conditioned on the following safe-

guards:

· A: The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile

Stewardship program to insure a high level of

confidence in the safety and reliability of

nuclear weapons in the active stockpile, includ-

ing the conduct of a broad range of effective

and continuing experimental programs.

· B: The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory

facilities and programs in theoretical and

exploratory nuclear technology which will

attract, retain, and ensure the continued appli-

cation of our human scientific resources to those

programs on which continued progress in nuclear

technology depends.

· C: The maintenance of the basic capability to

resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the

CTBT should the United States cease to be bound

to adhere to this treaty.

· D: Continuation of a comprehensive research and

development program to improve our treaty moni-

toring capabilities and operations.

· E: The continuing development of a broad range

of intelligence gathering and analytical capabil-

ities and operations to ensure accurate and com-

prehensive information on worldwide nuclear arse-

nals, nuclear weapons development programs, and

related nuclear programs.

· F: The understanding that if the President of

the United States is informed by the Secretary

of Defense and the Secretary of Energy--advised

by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of

DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and the

Commander of the US Strategic Command--that a

high level of confidence in the safety or relia-

bility of a nuclear weapon type which the

Secretaries consider to be critical to our

nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified,

the President, in consultation with Congress,

would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT

under the standard "supreme national interest