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designs have been identified solely as a result of a

nuclear test.8

A key question for the future is what the effects of

aging will be on U.S. nuclear weapons.  Some weapons parts

may become weaker as they age, but nonnuclear testing may

indicate that individually they are still functional.  If

they were subjected to a nuclear test, however, it might

be revealed that their collective weaknesses could cause a

weapon failure.

It would seem that rebuilding warheads regularly to

replace their parts and materials would correct age-related

problems that develop in nuclear warheads.  Indeed,

Russia's approach to ensuring reliability depends on

rebuilding; it produces thousands of weapons per year to

replace aging warheads in its inventory.

In the case of the U.S. arsenal, rebuilding warheads

to ensure reliability is not currently an option.  Some

components and materials are no longer available, and

there is no way to duplicate them.  The U.S. weapons-pro-

duction infrastructure has been allowed to decay and has

been purposefully cut to such a degree that the United

States no longer has facilities and trained personnel to

produce key weapons components.  There are plans, thus far

insufficiently budgeted, to restore the production infra-

structure.  However, the United States is presently unable

to produce complete warheads for the active stockpile.9

Some components could not be duplicated even if facilities

and personnel were available because environmental and

safety standards for manufacturing have evolved, making

some old processes unsafe or illegal, or both.  Creating

substitute parts is a risky undertaking.  It may not be

possible to determine, in the absence of nuclear testing,

what the functional equivalent of a particular component

or material is.  And there is a Catch-22: Even when new

U.S. production capabilities are built, it will be impos-

sible, absent nuclear testing, to validate the new plants,

processes, and people.  Nuclear tests are the only known

means of demonstrating that new production lines produce

functionally identical products.

In summary, CTBT opponents agree with proponents' con-

tention that the treaty will constrain the development and

modernization of nuclear weapons.  However, opponents view

that as a negative effect because unforeseen circumstances

could require significant changes in U.S. weapons that

would require testing.  Proponents also argue that it will

not matter that the United States is constrained, because

Russia, China, and other nations will be similarly con-