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likely to use new materials for which there are no testing

data.

In addition, as noted above, past U.S. nuclear

weapons testing did not focus on the tasks of building

databases and tools to ensure reliability of U.S. weapons

in the absence of testing.  Testing was part of the cra-

dle-to-grave process.  Although some arms control advocates

believe that all the original design flaws have been found

and fixed, the specialists responsible for U.S. nuclear

weapons know that is not true.

In October 1992, the U.S. nuclear weapons design lab-

oratories were asked what types of tests they would con-

duct if they were allowed 15 more tests to prepare for a

testing moratorium.  They laid out a series of tests to

address safety and reliability issues, to develop stockpile

stewardship data and tools, and to validate processes for

remanufacturing aging weapons.  Those tests were not

allowed by the Clinton administration.  President Clinton,

in his July 3, 1993, statement extending the U.S. morato-

rium, said, "Additional nuclear tests could help us pre-

pare for a CTB and provide additional improvements in

safety and reliability.  However . . . these benefits

would be outweighed by the price we would pay in conduct-

ing the tests now--through undercutting our nonprolifera-

tion goals."

Weapons Surveillance and Rebuilding May Fail to Find

Problems

Why can't measures other than nuclear testing--sur-

veillance of the stockpiled weapons, nonnuclear testing of

materials and components, and rebuilding of aging weapons--

reveal problems and provide high-confidence solutions?  To

some extent, they can and already have.  However, we have

learned from experience that weapons in the U.S. stockpile

can have design flaws or problems that are introduced as a

result of field handling.  A particularly difficult prob-

lem to address is what U.S. nuclear testing experts call

the "unknown unknown"--the unanticipated problem that is

exposed only by the extreme stresses encountered in the

environment of a full-scale nuclear test.  Many times in

the past, U.S. nuclear weapons designers were surprised by

the results of nuclear tests, which revealed problems the

designers had not imagined.  The tests showed them that

they had not understood conditions and technologies as

well as they had thought.  Thus, while some defects have

been discovered through surveillance of the stockpile and

nonnuclear testing, other problems with U.S. nuclear weapon