Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Page 8
and engineers: the people who designed the devices in the
stockpile and participated in testing them were still on
hand and provided solutions for the problems that were
found.  According to one expert, those scientists and
engineers have been repeatedly humbled by creating designs
in which they had the highest confidence, only to see a
test make a mockery of their assumptions and calculations.
The designers know the designs in the stockpile well.
Their experience in testing and working with the designs
over the years has enabled the designers to understand the
subtleties of changes and their effects on the weapons.
The experience and understanding of the experts who
designed the current U.S. nuclear weapons have not been
well documented because the entire U.S. nuclear weapons
program was predicated on the absolute need for and abili-
ty to conduct testing throughout the life of the design.
Testing was viewed as essential to the development and
proof of nuclear weapons designs, to ensuring the relia-
bility of the stockpile, and to correcting any problems
that occur.  With such dependence on nuclear testing,
extensive documentation was unnecessary.  Although an
effort is now under way to document and archive the expe-
riences of designers, there is no way to be sure that all
of their pertinent knowledge is recorded.  Problems may
also develop, particularly relating to the aging of weapon
components, for which the designers' knowledge is of lit-
tle or no help.
Of the 85 remaining nuclear weapons designers at Los
Alamos and Livermore laboratories, only 35 have been lead
designers on a nuclear test.7   In the future, as those
experts retire and die, there will be no nuclear weapons
experts who have actually designed a stockpiled weapon or
have gone through the rigors and learning processes of
nuclear testing.
Data from Past Tests Are Inadequate
Once a design is tested, why can't that test history
provide sufficient data and understanding to enable scien-
tists to fix any problems that develop later?  The answer
is that past testing data can help but will not necessari-
ly suffice.  Some problems may develop for which no test-
ing data are relevant.  For example, the effects of aging
on weapons components and materials is unknown.  The heat
from radioactive materials may make weapons parts brittle,
an effect similar to the degradation of plastics under
prolonged exposure to sunlight.  Replacement parts are