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to be in the stockpile in 2000, compared to 30 in 1985, a

single problem could affect a large fraction of the U.S.

nuclear force."5

As noted previously, some less advanced types of

nuclear weapons designs do not require testing to ensure

reliability.  Such designs are relatively simple, and

their performance can be calculated and modeled with high

confidence.  Advanced designs, such as those in the U.S.

stockpile, are extremely complicated.  They have many

variables and several thousand components.  Such sophisti-

cated designs have been produced to make U.S. weapons very

small and able to withstand rapid acceleration, heat, and

impact.  With the technology available today, there is no

way to simulate nuclear detonation of the high-performance,

complex designs in the U.S. stockpile.

Some CTBT proponents nevertheless contend that nuclear

testing is unnecessary to ensure reliability of the U.S.

stockpile.  They make three arguments: there has been no

decline in reliability since U.S. testing ceased in 1992;

past testing has left a legacy of understanding sufficient

to fix any future problems; and surveillance, nonnuclear

testing, and rebuilding weapons will correct flaws.

Evidence speaks to the contrary for each of those asser-

tions.

Confidence in U.S. Nuclear Weapons Has Already Declined

There has indeed been a decline in the confidence in

the U.S. stockpile since testing ceased in 1992.  In 1997

the director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sig

Hecker, wrote to Sen. Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), stating that con-

fidence in the U.S. stockpile had decreased since the last

U.S. test in 1992.  Hecker also said that several prob-

lems, some of them age related, had developed, which pre-

viously "we would have turned to a nuclear test in the

kiloton range to resolve."6

In 1997 it was possible to fix the warhead problems

and to certify the reliability of the stockpile with con-

fidence--but not to achieve the high level of confidence

that would come from a test.  The 1958-61 test moratorium

provides a relevant comparison.  At that time, some stock-

pile problems were fixed, and there was confidence that

the solutions worked.  When the moratorium ended and test-

ing resumed, the "fixes" were found to be inadequate.

A key reason for the confidence that allowed certifi-

cation in 1997 was the presence of experienced scientists