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nuclear weapons safer will be discovered.  For example, it

is possible that in the future researchers will invent

less sensitive explosives.  Because nuclear weapons are

extraordinarily complex, testing would be required in most

cases before such advances could be integrated into stock-

pile designs.

The argument for preserving the option of moderniza-

tion for the sake of safety is rejected by some people who

feel that existing nuclear weapons are safe enough.

However, the U.S. government decided not to integrate some

existing safety features--insensitive high explosives and

fire-retardant pits--into some nuclear weapons in the U.S.

arsenal because to do so would require nuclear testing.

That proves the point that the inability to test foreclos-

es safety improvements.

In summary, the CTBT will constrain nuclear weapons

modernization, which will very likely have a negative

effect on U.S. national security.  Inability to modernize

warheads will greatly complicate the task of designing and

building more modern delivery systems, despite the fact

that such upgrades may be necessitated by advancements in

other nations' countermeasures.  Lack of modernization may

also prevent the United States from using nuclear weapons

for new missions for which they could be the most effec-

tive and appropriate option.  Evolution in technologies

for safety, nuclear delivery systems, and enemy defenses

may render the now-modern U.S. nuclear arsenal technologi-

cally obsolete or less safe.

The CTBT Would Reduce Confidence in the Reliability of

U.S. Nuclear Weapons

Ensuring reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons means

having high confidence that they will perform as intended.

Reliability does not mean that every weapon of a given

design must work correctly but rather that most will.  To

use another automobile industry analogy, a few lemons are

tolerable--even expected--but a serious flaw that is common

to all autos of a given type requires a recall.  Ensuring

reliability means that no "recall" will be warranted.

The premium placed on ascertaining the reliability of

nuclear weapons is increasing because the size of the U.S.

stockpile is declining, as is the mix of weapons designs

within it.  As noted by Jonathan Medalia of the

Congressional Research Service, "A problem with one warhead

type can affect hundreds or thousands of individual de-

ployed warheads; with only nine types of warheads expected