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liferation of missiles armed with chemical or biological
agents becomes a more serious threat to the United States
and its allies in the future, it may be prudent to include
in the U.S. nuclear arsenal some warheads designed specif-
ically for the mission of destroying such agents either in
their storage areas or on incoming missiles.
Preserving the option of modernizing U.S. nuclear
weapons is also important in the context of other nations'
emerging defensive technologies. We cannot now know what
means opponents may develop to render U.S. warheads or
delivery vehicles obsolete. Such technological break-
throughs could necessitate a complete overhaul of U.S.
delivery systems and nuclear warheads.
New Delivery Systems Can Require New Warheads
Nuclear warheads are designed to be mated with spe-
cific delivery systems. As aircraft and missiles age,
they must be replaced. Furthermore, as adversaries devel-
op countermeasures, U.S. delivery systems must be improved
to ensure that they will be able to accomplish their mis-
sions. The newer systems are likely to have more advanced
electronics, materials, performance criteria, and other
attributes--all of which affect the optimal design of the
weapons they deliver. (It is possible to reverse the
process and to design delivery vehicles to the parameters
of existing warheads, but that could be more expensive and
might have a less than optimal outcome.)
It is possible to make some changes to warhead design
without testing. However, for nuclear weapons to continue
to be deliverable by newer systems, it may be necessary to
change the weight, size, and shape of the warhead.
Without testing, the ability to significantly change the
parameters of U.S. nuclear warheads will be extremely lim-
ited.
Lack of Modernization Forecloses Safety Improvements
Think of the safety improvements to automobiles that
have resulted from evolving technology over the past
decade. Advances in materials science, electronics, and
concept innovation have led to better crash proofing, air
bags, design principles, and so on. Those improvements
could not have been introduced without actual testing.
Similarly, we can assume that nuclear weapons technol-
ogy will continue to advance and that new measures to make