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tion and development of nuclear weapons by the states that

now have them.  The preamble of the CTBT states that

the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explo-

sions and all other nuclear explosions, by con-

straining the development and qualitative

improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the

development of advanced new types of nuclear

weapons, constitutes an effective measure of

nuclear disarmament.3

Although some CTBT proponents in the United States do

not view the treaty as leading inevitably to disarmament,

there is no question that the abolition of testing will

have the effect of constraining development and improvement

of nuclear weapons.  The directors of U.S. and Russian

nuclear weapons laboratories have stated that they would

not choose to introduce new warhead designs into their

countries' stockpiles without nuclear testing.4

The important question to ask is whether constraining

nuclear modernization is desirable.  There are serious

implications, as outlined below.

Modernization May Be Needed for New Requirements

Constraining modernization is risky because it seri-

ously degrades the ability of the United States to tailor

its arsenal to emerging or as yet unknown threats or to

adapt it to changes in other nations' defensive technolo-

gies.

At present, the United States has no specific need

for new nuclear weapons designs, but that may not always

be the case.  Desert Storm, for example, taught us that we

need to be able to strike and destroy deeply buried tar-

gets such as underground bunkers.  The United States has

modified an existing nuclear weapon to satisfy this new

mission.

Another emerging mission for which nuclear warheads

might be the most effective weapon is destroying chemical

and biological agents.  If an offensive missile were

intercepted by a defensive missile armed with a high-

explosive warhead, the chemical or biological agent would

probably not be destroyed.  It would simply be further

dispersed.  If the offensive missile were intercepted with

a low-yield nuclear warhead, however, the agent--even the

hardiest agents such as anthrax--would be destroyed by the

high heat generated by the nuclear explosion.  If the pro-