Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
<<  <  >  >>
Page 2
Introduction
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed
by the United States on September 24, 1996, and transmit-
ted by President Clinton to the U.S. Senate almost one
year later, on September 22, 1997.  The CTBT is a treaty
of unlimited duration that bans nuclear weapons test
explosions and all other nuclear explosions.  The treaty
establishes an international organization, located in
Vienna, Austria, that will have an executive council, a
technical secretariat, and a conference of all the states
that are party to the treaty.  The organization will over-
see the treaty's verification regime, called the
International Monitoring System (IMS), and an International
Data Center.  The IMS consists of four types of monitor-
ing, including seismological.  Requests for on-site inspec-
tions will require approval by a vote of at least 30 of
the treaty's 51-member Executive Council.
The CTBT will enter into force only when all 44
nations with nuclear power or research reactors, or both,
have ratified it.  If the CTBT has not entered into force
by October 1999, nations that have ratified it may convene
annually to consider ways to accelerate the ratification
and entry into force of the treaty.
In the case of the United States, ratification
requires that the U.S. Senate give its advice and consent.
Because the CTBT is likely to have a profound impact on
the reliability and future safety of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent, the treaty's ratification is contentious.
This paper does not address the debate regarding abo-
lition of nuclear weapons.  It is now, and likely will
continue to be, the policy of the United States to rely on
nuclear deterrence for its security.  President Clinton
has stated,
As part of our national security strategy, the
United States must and will retain strategic
nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future
hostile foreign leadership with access to strate-
gic nuclear forces from acting against our vital
interests and to convince it that seeking a
nuclear advantage would be futile.  In this
regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and
reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme
national interest of the United States.1
Nuclear abolition is, however, at the heart of the
CTBT debate.  The preamble of the treaty clearly states