Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Page 5
The conservative claim--that the meaning of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause is unknown and unknowable--has
its origins in the midcentury work of Charles Fairman.12
Attempting to show that the clause was not meant to
incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states, Fairman
claimed to have discovered that it had no meaning at all;
thus, he cites Congressman George S. Boutwell of
Massachusetts, a member of the joint committee that draft-
ed the amendment, as claiming that the amendment's princi-
pal author, Ohio congressman John Bingham, inserted the
clause because "its euphony and indefiniteness of meaning
were a charm to him."13   Conservatives thus dismiss the
clause by dismissing John Bingham--Berger calling him "mud-
dled" and "inept,"14 Graglia saying that he used language
solely for the purpose of "venting vaporous sentiment,"15
and Bork contenting himself with repeating Fairman's
claim.16   Those conservatives do not explain, of course,
how Congress came to be led by such a fool in so signifi-
cant a matter as the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Graglia says that happened "for reasons as to which we
have no information."17   Professing such ignorance, Bork
can conclude, apparently without irony, that the judicial
evisceration of the clause in Slaughterhouse was a "victo-
ry for judicial moderation."18
Yet even if Bingham can be dismissed as a man with a
"peculiar mode of thought,"19 which the evidence hardly
compels,20 by no means does it follow that the instrument
he drafted is meaningless.  To discern the meaning, howev-
er, we have to ask not simply what the author may have had
in mind but what those who passed and ratified the clause
may have understood it to mean.  Was there a generally
accepted meaning for "privileges or immunities" at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment?  When
that question is better answered than it is by conserva-
tives--to say nothing of modern liberals, who too often
turn broadly worded clauses into open-ended warrants for
judicial lawmaking--it turns out that the loss of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause is more than surprising:
it is deeply troubling.  For not only was the clause meant
to be the centerpiece of section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment; more important, it was meant to be a reflection
of the underlying theory of the original Constitution and
a link to the natural rights principles of the Declaration
of Independence that form the intellectual foundation of
American constitutionalism.  Thus, the rejection of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause represents a rejection of
that moral, political, and legal heritage.
To better appreciate the significance of that rejec-
tion, and to urge that the Privileges or Immunities Clause