Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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Page 2
Introduction
Rosemary Furman had for years openly and flagrantly
violated the laws of Florida.  Her final appeal was turned
down by the Florida Supreme Court, which ordered that she be
jailed.1  Her crime was to have helped, by preparing and
filing the necessary legal papers, people who wanted a di-
vorce.  Her customers sought her services and willingly paid
for them.  None had ever complained about her work.
Before engaging in that "criminal activity," Furman had
been a legal secretary doing exactly the same paperwork, but
under the "supervision" of an attorney.  He charged clients
$300 to handle a divorce, then paid her a small fraction of
that amount for her work.  Furman thought that high price
for filing for divorce was unconscionable, particularly in
cases where battered women were unable to obtain a divorce
because they could not afford the attorney's fees.  So she
decided to go into business for herself, charging only $50
for divorce filings.  At first, she worked only with bat-
tered women.  Later, however, she expanded her business to
assist anyone who wanted her services.  She did a large
volume of business.
Despite her success--doubtless, because of it--Furman
was headed for trouble: she was acting in violation of the
law.  Under Florida law, only licensed attorneys may engage
in "the practice of law."  She was not a licensed attorney,
and the preparation of divorce papers was regarded by the
Florida Bar as work only attorneys could do.  After the bar
brought action against her, she was ordered to cease and
desist from her illegal conduct.  She refused.  For her
unwillingness to stop doing work she wanted to do and her
clients wanted her to do for them, she was ordered by the
Florida Supreme Court to serve 120 days in jail, 90 of which
would be suspended if she promised not to violate the law
again.  Subsequent intervention by the governor kept her
from doing actual jail time.  The point was made, though;
she never again competed in the market for legal services.
The case of Furman, hardly unique, raises several
important questions.  Should it be illegal for individuals
to enter a field of work and contract with willing clients
without first obtaining governmental permission to do so?
Does the U.S. Constitution give the states unchecked power
to restrict the freedom to choose one's occupation, by
imposing onerous and arbitrary licensing requirements?  Does
the licensing of attorneys (and other service providers)
rectify some market failure and improve consumer welfare, or