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Despite that political backdrop, NATO has been helping

to arm and equip Albania's military, even selecting it as

the first beneficiary of NATO's Partnership for Peace pri-

vate contracting efforts.59   Further, in August and

September of this year, the alliance conducted war games

with Albania's army, thereby improving its war-fighting

skills and raising its confidence.60   The CIA, meanwhile,

has intensified ties with Albania's SHIK secret service

agency, helping it restructure and modernize its intelli-

gence-gathering capabilities.61   In carrying out such activ-

ities, Washington may be unwittingly helping to build up

the very forces that will initiate the spread of the

Kosovo conflict should Berisha return to power.

The most dangerous scenario for spreading Kosovo's

conflict is that NATO intervention inadvertently assists

the KLA in its pursuit of forging a Greater Albania.  The

KLA has made it clear that its goal is not simply to lib-

erate Kosovo from Yugoslavia, but to unite the ethnic

Albanians of Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania.62

It is for that reason that Macedonia's foreign minister,

Blagoj Handziski, and Greece's foreign minister, Theodoros

Pangalos, have put aside the squabbles between their coun-

tries and issued a joint statement opposing air strikes

against Serbia because they could bolster the KLA's cam-

paign.  "Once the bitterest of neighbors," explains the

Associated Press, "Greece and Macedonia have united in the

fear that a successful campaign by the separatist Kosovo

Liberation Army could spell disaster for the Balkans."63

Economic Sanctions

But it's not only military intervention that could

have unintended consequences for Kosovo.  Economic sanc-

tions could prove counterproductive as well.  During the

1992-1995 war in Bosnia, for example, the West imposed

comprehensive economic sanctions on Serbia.  Those measures

caused young people to abandon the country and impover-

ished the general population, while Serbian strongman

Slobodan Milosevic accumulated riches through smuggled

imports.

What's more, Milosevic's grip on power actually tight-

ened when sanctions were last imposed.  He controlled sev-

eral newspapers and television stations, and the sanctions

enabled him to blame external forces for his failed eco-

nomic policies.  Leading Cuban dissidents have long point-

ed to similar tactics used by Castro's regime to explain

away Cuba's economic woes.64