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goes unchecked, it could have much wider implications than

just Kosovo."53   In fact, the administration worries that

if Albania enters the fray, Turkey, a state with a strong

Muslim tradition, could enter on the side of the

Albanians, and Greece, an Orthodox Christian state and

cultural ally of Serbia, could support the Serb side.

NATO intervention, the administration reasons, is therefore

necessary to prevent two NATO members--Greece and Turkey--

from potentially fighting one another.  In stark contrast,

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright argued during the

NATO enlargement debates earlier this year that expanding

NATO would make Europe safer by increasing the number of

countries that simply do not fight with each other.54   The

Clinton administration, in short, wants to have it both

ways, arguing at one point that NATO should be expanded

because alliance members do not fight with one another,

and arguing later that the United States should intervene

in Kosovo to keep alliance members from doing just that.

Yet military intervention could itself cause Kosovo's

conflict to spread, perhaps leading to the intra-NATO con-

flict Washington seeks to avoid.  For example, if inter-

vention consists of deploying the 20,000 troops NATO mili-

tary planners say are necessary to prevent the flow of

arms from crossing the Albania-Kosovo border, that will

not stop the fighting in Kosovo.55   It will simply prevent

many Kosovar Albanians from acquiring weapons.  The

resulting bloodshed of a continuing Serbian crackdown could

create greater nationalist political pressures in neighbor-

ing Albania, not less, and increase the likelihood that

Albania will become directly involved in the conflict.

The prospect of Albania's further involvement in

Kosovo should not be underestimated.  Former Albanian

president Sali Berisha refers to the fighting in Kosovo as

a "holy war" and defines the "Albanian nation" as includ-

ing not only Albania but also Kosovo and western

Macedonia, both of which have large ethnic Albanian popu-

lations.56   He also called Albania's last prime minister,

Fatos Nano, an "enemy of the Albanian nation" for failing

to support Kosovo's secessionist forces and has given his

family farm in northern Albania to the KLA to use as a

military training ground.57   Berisha's rhetoric and decision

to deliver his birthplace to the rebels is part of his

manipulation of the Kosovo crisis to mount a political

comeback after his ouster in 1997.  Last month, Berisha's

supporters undertook an armed uprising in Albania's capi-

tal, seized government buildings, and set fire to Prime

Minister Nano's office.58   Nano resigned his office two

weeks later.