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What's more, U.S. threats of military intervention

helped harden the Kosovar Albanian demand for independence

from Yugoslavia.  That's because military threats conveyed

a contradictory message; that although U.S. policy was

officially opposed to independence for Kosovo, Washington

would not allow Belgrade to forcibly resist it.  The U.S.

threats also emboldened the KLA rebels.  As the New York

Times reported,

Recently, under pressure from Western govern-

ments, the Yugoslav forces have reduced larger-

scale attacks on rebel areas. . . . Now, howev-

er, some foreign diplomats say Serbian reluctance

to order soldiers to retake territory is leading

the rebels to assume they have little to fear

from government forces.  "Instead of calming

things down and letting us figure out how to get

everyone to the negotiation table, what we've

done is give the Albanian fighters a feeling of

euphoria," said a Western diplomat. . . . "This

makes them bolder, and it also makes other

Albanians want to join them."48

After that, the Clinton administration softened its

threats on the Yugoslav government and made an attempt to

reverse the perception that it favors the ethnic Albanian

side of the Kosovo dispute.  In July, the United States

and five European nations made their first public criti-

cism of the KLA, issuing a statement admonishing the

rebels and stressing that "violence is inadmissible and

will not solve the problem of Kosovo."49   But the Clinton

administration's actions told ethnic Albanians a different

story: The administration does consider violence "admissi-

ble."  In fact, U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke trav-

eled to Kosovo, met with the KLA, and legitimized its vio-

lence by offering its representatives a spot on the ethnic

Albanian negotiating team.  In stark contrast, Ambassador

Holbrooke snubbed an invitation to meet with Serbian

Orthodox Bishop Artemije, who leads a two year old peace

movement with a plan that would simultaneously ease ten-

sions in Kosovo and reduce the power of Slobodan

Milosevic.

Today, backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1199,

the Clinton administration is once again demanding that

Belgrade withdraw its internal security forces from Kosovo,

or face a NATO response.  But if NATO intervenes, it could

encourage the Kosovo conflict still further.  Indeed, if

intervention consists of a cruise missile attack, air

strikes, or the imposition of a no-fly zone over Kosovo,

the guerrilla forces of the KLA will be encouraged to con-