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U.S. troop involvement in the Balkans, however, is mis-

guided.

First, the events in Kosovo pose no threat to U.S.

national security--neither the territorial integrity, nor

the national sovereignty, nor the general welfare of the

United States is in jeopardy.  Further, a peacekeeping or

other noncombat policing mission in Kosovo might actually

harm U.S. national security by keeping American soldiers

away from military training, thereby reducing their combat

readiness.  In fact, reports the Washington Post,

Over the past decade, the [U.S.] Army has been

used in 29 substantial overseas deployments, com-

pared with 10 in the four previous decades.  The

strain of the pace of such operations on a much

reduced force has shown up in negative trend

lines across all military services across various

readiness categories.36

A Kosovo peacekeeping mission will simply add to the prob-

lem by further compromising U.S. military preparedness.

Second, military intervention in Kosovo will encounter

fervent and incompatible ethnic interests that are unlikely

to be dislodged by an American presence.  On one side of

the dispute are ethnic Albanians, most of whom boycott

Serbian state institutions, resist speaking the Serbian

language, and view Serbian state security forces as an

occupation army.  In addition, most ethnic Albanians in

Kosovo are Muslim.

On the other side of the dispute are Serbs who con-

sider Kosovo the cradle of their culture and Christian

orthodox religion, and are about as willing to give up

Kosovo to Albanians as Israelis are to give up Jerusalem

to Palestinians.  In fact, 42 percent of Serbs polled

recently said they believed that "the solution to the

Kosovo problem was the removal, by force or peaceful

means, of its Albanian majority."37   And on April 23, 97

percent of Serbs participating in a national referendum

reportedly said they oppose foreign mediation of talks

with Kosovar Albanians.38   Putting American ground troops

in the middle of that kind of conflict is bound to produce

casualties.  Moreover, because intervention would entail

violating the borders of Yugoslavia, it could further

entrench Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic by uniting

Serbs behind him.

Third, NATO intervention in Kosovo could unfold as it

has in Bosnia; that is, with no end in sight.  It should