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based largely on the demographic principle--the

majority argument.  Since these claims are mutu-

ally incompatible, there is little reason to

believe that Kosovo will be easy to solve.25

Similarly, Amos Perlmutter, professor of political

science at American University, notes, "Kosovo is the most

intractable postwar Balkan conflict to date. . . . This is

because the Serbs and their [ethnic] Albanian rivals are

irreconcilable, poised to inflict heavy damage on one

another to fulfill their conflicting aspirations."26

Ironically, over the course of the last 50 years,

Kosovo has gone from being Tito's lure to bring Albania

into a federation with Yugoslavia to a province that wants

to secede.  It is tempting to compare the situation in

Kosovo today with that in Bosnia in 1991, but there are

differences.  The key distinction is that Kosovo, unlike

Bosnia, was never a constituent republic of Yugoslavia.

Indeed, since the 1913 London Treaty, which ended the

First Balkan War, Kosovo has been recognized by the inter-

national community as part of Serbia.

Washington's Reaction

Washington's reaction to Belgrade's February-March

crackdown was immediate.  "We are not going to stand by

and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they

can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia," warned U.S.

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright on March 7.27   Two

days later, she announced that the United States reserved

the right to take unilateral action against the Serbian

government, saying, "We know what we need to know to

believe we are seeing ethnic cleansing all over again."28

After holding emergency meetings in London and Bonn,

the Balkan Contact Group--representing the United States,

Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy--agreed

on an arms embargo against Serbia, a freeze on export

credits to Belgrade, and a denial of visas to officials

involved in the crackdown in Kosovo.  Not satisfied with

the Contact Group's sanctions package, the United States

left the door open to military intervention.  In fact,

when asked about that possibility, Robert Gelbard,

President Clinton's special envoy to the Balkans, told a

congressional hearing, we will first use "every possible

economic sanction or other kind of tool we have diplomati-

cally, but we aren't ruling anything out."29