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tions in 1995 established procedures permitting the speedy
identification and granting of meritorious claims, the
referral of all other claims to immigration court for pro-
ceedings to remove people from the United States, and the
streamlining of asylum procedures to help asylum officers
keep current with incoming applications.20 The INS in-
creased its asylum officer corps and the Department of
Justice hired more immigration judges to adjudicate asylum
applications more quickly. The 1995 regulations also elimi-
nated the automatic grant of a work permit when an applica-
tion for asylum is filed. Instead, a procedure was estab-
lished whereby most work permits are not granted until after
a person receives asylum or the application has been on file
with the INS for 180 days.21 Consequently, the prospect of
receiving work authorization, long perceived as a magnet for
frivolous asylum claims, was eliminated.
Those reforms worked. New asylum applications declined
by more than 60 percent, yet existing claims are currently
being heard in record numbers.22 In 1994, before the re-
forms took effect, more than 123,500 affirmative asylum
applications were filed with the INS. In contrast, in 1996,
the year after the regulations took effect, there were fewer
than 50,000 affirmative applications. The approval rate
also increased from 15 percent in 1994 to 26 percent in 1996
for applications filed after the 1995 reforms took ef-
fect.23 Equally significant, since implementing the 1995
regulations, the INS has been adjudicating new claims for
asylum within 60 days of their receipt, a dramatic reduction
from the months (and sometimes years) the INS needed to
adjudicate claims before reform.24 Because there are now
more asylum officers and immigration judges, the number of
asylum cases completed in a year has more than doubled.
Besides keeping current with newly filed applications, the
INS is working through its backlogged cases in record num-
bers. Thus did the 1995 regulatory reforms respond to and
solve many of the perceived problems with the asylum system.
Facts Colliding with Congressional Acts
New facts and changed circumstances, one might think,
would have led Congress to reexamine its proposed changes to
asylum law. After all, the INS had already instituted the
necessary reforms. Problems in the asylum system were
largely solved. Yet such new information did not interfere
with the desire to pass a law anyway: IIRIRA became law in