Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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State licensing
Slowly, the states followed by expanding
Introduction
the scopes of practice of nonphysician clini-
laws require
cians. Many states adopted laws to allow nurse
physicians for
In the United States, the authority to regu-
practitioners to practice independently and to
tasks that could
late medical professionals lies with the states. To
prescribe controlled substances--tasks histori-
practice within a state, clinicians must obtain a
cally reserved for physicians. The fact that
be performed by
license from that state's government. State
nonphysician clinicians could provide certain
less-skilled
statutes dictate standards for licensing and dis-
types of care for less money than physicians
ciplining medical professionals. They also list
led to the broader use of such mid-level pro-
professionals.
tasks clinicians are allowed to perform (called a
fessionals in all aspects of health care.
clinician's "scope of practice"). One view is that
Organizations representing mid-level clini-
state licensing of medical professionals assures
cians--including nurse practitioners, physi-
quality. Another view is that licensing is ineffec-
cian assistants, nurse midwives, physical ther-
tive and makes consumers worse off.
apists, podiatrists, and optometrists, among
States first began to license physicians in
many others--continue to advocate broader
the early part of the 20th century. In effect,
scopes of practice for their members, ostensi-
states handed the administration of physi-
bly to increase access to care. However, these
cian-licensing laws to state boards composed
same groups are less concerned about access
of physicians. Likewise, states vested over-
to care when it comes to the role of other clin-
sight of medical school accreditation in the
icians. And they are anxious to raise education
American Medical Association, which repre-
requirements for new entrants to their profes-
sents the interests of physicians.
sions. Such requirements clearly reduce access.
Many observers have suggested that licens-
An important question is whether such
ing laws give physicians too much power.
determinations even belong in the political
Leading economists--including Nobel Laureate
arena, where decisions are subject to intense
Milton Friedman and University of Chicago
lobbying by parties whose interests might not
professor Reuben Kessel--have argued that
align with those of consumers. Researchers at
state licensing laws unnecessarily restrict the
the University of California, San Francisco,
supply of medical care.1 In his 1963 article on
Center for the Health Professions observe,
health economics in the American Economic
"Interest groups with strong lobbies play a sig-
Review, Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow noted
nificant role in shaping [scope-of-practice] leg-
islation."5
that state licensing laws were needlessly restric-
Any group of mid-level clinicians that can
tive, requiring physicians to perform tasks that
sway legislators can get its scope of practice
could be performed ably and less expensively by
less-skilled professionals.2 From this point of
expanded or increase education require-
view, liberalizing state licensing laws could
ments for new entrants. Alternatively, a pow-
make health care more available and less expen-
erful physician lobby can block changes to
sive without harming quality.
the scopes of practice of mid-level practition-
It took growing healthcare costs to moti-
ers that would impinge on its members' turf.
vate partial liberalization. Following the pas-
In this paper, I argue that these determina-
sage of Medicare and Medicaid legislation in
tions do not belong in the political arena.
the United States in 1965, the demand for
State oversight of medical licensing and scope
physician services increased dramatically. To
of practice has negative consequences for con-
keep costs down, politicians at the federal lev-
sumers. Consumers would benefit were states
el reduced entry barriers for foreign-trained
to eliminate professional licensing in medi-
physicians.3 In 1972, nearly 45 percent of
cine and leave education, credentialing, and
newly licensed physicians in the United
scope-of-practice decisions to the private sec-
States were foreign-trained, up from approx-
tor and the courts.
imately 20 percent in the 1960s.4
2