legally. But current immigration law is a
Notes
greater threat to the rule of law than any of
the people crossing the border to come here
1. John J. Miller and Stephen Moore, "A National
and work. Our immigration policies have fos-
ID System: Big Brother's Solution to Illegal Immi-
gration," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 237,
tered the illegality so common in the employ-
September 7, 1995, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas
ment area.
/pa237.html.
Heavier internal enforcement would not
reduce the illegality--it would promote it.
2. Ibid.
Faced with the alternative of living in poverty
3. Public Law 99-603, codified at U.S. Code 8 §
and failing to remit wealth to their families,
1324a et seq.
illegal immigrants would deepen the modest
identity frauds they are involved in today.
4. "Fed's Poole Says U.S. Economy Near Full Em-
ployment, Trade Not Destroying Jobs," Forbes.
Their actions would draw American citizens,
com, September 6, 2007, http://www.forbes.com
unfortunately, into a federal bureaucratic
/markets/feeds/afx/2007/09/06/afx4089152.html.
identity vortex.
For minimal gains in illegal immigration
5. Daniel T. Griswold, "Immigration Reform Must
Include a Temporary Worker Program," Orange
control, national EEV would sacrifice more-
County Register, March 7, 2007, http://www.freetr
important founding principles: the liberty
ade.org/node/600.
and personal freedom of American citizens;
constitutionally mandated limits on federal
6. The consensus is mistaken. See Daniel Griswold,
"A Boon Rather Than a Burden," Politic.org,
power; low taxes, minimal regulation, and
August 27, 2007, http://www.freetrade.org/node/
competition; and privacy.
741.
Instead of moving to electronic eligibility
verification, the policy of internal enforce-
7. Act to Encourage Immigration, 38th Cong., 1st
sess. (July 4, 1864), U.S. Statutes at Large 13 (1864):
ment should be eliminated, root and branch.
38587.
The need for it can be dissipated, and legality
fostered anew, by aligning immigration poli-
8. Public Law 99-603, codified at U.S. Code 8 §
cy with the economic interests of the Ameri-
1324a et seq.
can people. Legal immigration levels should
9. Ibid., § 101(a)(1), codified at U.S. Code 8 §
be increased.
1324a(a)(1).
Up to this point in our nation's history,
employers and workers have decided who
10. Ibid., §101(a)(1)(B), 101(b), codified at U.S.
Code 8 § 1324a(a)(1)(B), 1324a(b).
should work for whom. Even under the IRCA
regime as it stands now, employers select
11. Because it is clandestine, illegal immigration is
whom they will hire, perhaps accepting some
difficult to measure, but the Center for Immigra-
potential liability if they hire someone who is
tion Studies estimated in 1997 that about 420,000
illegal aliens joined the long-term population each
"ineligible."
year during the previous 10-year period (offset by
Letting workers and employers get togeth-
deaths, emigration, and adjustment to legal status
er on their own terms makes eminent sense,
that resulted in an increase of 275,000 annually).
just like people deciding for themselves what
Steven A. Camarota, "5 Million Illegal Immigrants:
An Analysis of New INS Numbers," Center for Im-
food they should eat and how to school their
migration Studies, Immigration Review 28 (Spring
children. With nationwide electronic employ-
1997), http://www.cis.org/articles/1997/IR28/5mi
ment verification, however, the United States
llion.html.
would move to a regime where the last word
12. Public Law 104-208, U.S. Statutes at Large 110
on employment decisions would not be with
(1996): p. 309.
the worker and employer but with bureau-
crats in the federal government. This result
13. See generally, Richard M. Stana, director,
would extend federal government power into
Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, Testimony
an area where it has no business being.
19