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Governments

majority of people, however, employment eligi-

without these things, but the chances of that

bility under IRCA is not such a program. Most

being done are very, very slim.

have strong

workers in the United States who are citizens

interests in

will be eligible to work under IRCA for their

A Narrow, Nonidentifying Alternative

tracking people,

entire lives. Maintaining data about them after

A credential such as eligibility for employ-

a biometric work-eligibility card has issued

ment under IRCA can be proved without cre-

for both

would not serve any administrative purpose.

ating a nationwide biometric tracking scheme.

legitimate and

Nevertheless, the government would not

In fact, templates already exist. But it is unlike-

accept a tracking-free system for two reasons.

ly to see adoption.

not-so-legitimate

First, a system like EEV "requires" identifica-

The Transportation Security Administra-

reasons.

tion and tracking to shift the risk of error in

tion's Registered Traveler program currently

the card-issuance process from the govern-

accepts privately issued documents like the

Clear card46 from Verified Identity Pass, Inc., to

ment to the citizen. A wrongly issued work-

eligibility card that does not also publicly

prove a person's membership in RT. The Clear

identify the bearer could not be cancelled or

system is designed so that it does not create

recalled if it were issued because of mistake,

records of travelers' use of the system, even as it

fraud, or corruption. All cards would have to

provides biometric proof of their membership

be replaced if the government had failed to

in RT using iris and fingerprint scanning.

administer its system well.

A similar system could verify employment

Second, tracking preserves government

eligibility without surveillance and tracking.

power. A work-eligibility and tracking system

The government agency or other credential

such as EEV makes the individual's employ-

provider would have to examine applicants'

ment eligibility subject to revision at a later

proof of citizenship (and noncitizens' proof

time, if the government wants to change the

of eligibility) and, without making copies of these

rules or adapt the system to new purposes,

documents or of the person's biometrics, issue a

for example. A nonidentifying work-autho-

biometric card or token that indicates to ver-

rization card or token denies government the

ifiers only work eligibility and any time limits

power to change its policies without the

on that eligibility. When a person was hired,

expense and effort of reissuing all cards or

a biometric tie to records securely stored on

tokens.

the card or token would indicate his or her

Governments are averse to accepting the

eligibility for employment.

risk of error, and they rarely exhibit the disci-

As simple as such a system would be,

pline needed to avoid tracking of people who

strong government resistance makes it very

interact with their programs.48 Unless the fed-

unlikely that it will see the light of day. The

TSA currently requires that Clear card users

eral government can accept the risk of error

present government-issued ID at airports, for

and is willing to commit to lasting employ-

example, even though the Clear system pre-

ment eligibility rules, it will require any inter-

sents biometric proof of RT membership

nal enforcement program to use databases

based on a government-issued ID that the

and tracking rather than just issuing cards

Clear user previously presented. (Verified

that prove eligibility to work and nothing

Identity Pass CEO Steven Brill has charitably

more. It will push Americans toward a nation-

characterized the TSA's defenses of this dou-

al ID and worker surveillance system.

ble-ID rule as "plainly absurd.")47

Some people claim that they would prefer

a national ID and this kind of surveillance to

Governments have strong interests in track-

attack the scourge of illegal immigration. But

ing people, for both legitimate and not-so-legit-

the costs of such a system--in American citi-

imate reasons. Many government programs

zens' dollars, in privacy, and in lost American

accord rights and benefits based on biographi-

values--would be substantial, even as it failed

cal information that must be recorded, main-

to curtail illegal immigration.

tained, and periodically checked. For the vast

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