Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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encryption. Printing or embedding informa-
a card to the subject. Here, as in the second
tion in a card using cryptographic techniques
step, employers will not be terribly eager to dis-
can establish with a high degree of certainty
cover deception, such as someone presenting
that the information was placed there by a
the card of a person similar in appearance. A
particular agency and that it has not been
number of factors explain why the verifier
altered since it was placed there. This tech-
check is weak in the employment context.
nique can, however, conceal from the ID sub-
People are better at recognizing faces of their
jects themselves what is on the cards they
own race and familiar races than faces that
must carry and display. The photo-screening
look different. Strong social pressures exist--
tool pilot program is a very crude, noncryp-
from the fear of rudeness to the appearance of
tographic version of this kind of security,
racism--not to second-guess the picture on
showing that the photo on a card has not
the card a person has presented. The third step
been replaced or altered.
in the identification-by-card process is anoth-
The veracity of the information that makes
er weakness.
it onto a card may be the most challenging ele-
ment to improve. After all, the information on
The Ideal Fix? Cradle-to-Grave Biometric
identity cards is a collection of biographical
Tracking
data--name, date of birth, address, height,
Each of the steps can be shored up, of
weight, and such--that is not easily verifiable.
course, and some of them would be strength-
Names change or hyphenate, for example, as
ened in small ways by elements of EEV. But
people marry, divorce, and remarry.
the things necessary to make a system like
The way to ensure that accurate data are
this really impervious to forgery and fraud
found on a card is to abandon the current
would convert it from an identity system into
practice of allowing applicants for identity
a cradle-to-grave biometric tracking system.
cards to submit information about them-
Almost no way exists to do national EEV that
selves. Rather, identity information and
is not a step down that road.
records of important life events could be cat-
Let us take the identification-by-card
aloged from birth (or a person's first entry
process and assess what is necessary to make
into the country) using powerful machine-
it hold up against the frauds, forgeries, and
readable biometrics, all the way up to DNA, as
other weaknesses that undermine EEV:
"index card" identifiers. The photo-screening
Verification of identifiers, the verifier
tool is a step in this direction: it begins to
check that ties the card to the bearer, can be
make the dossier as important as the card.
strengthened and improved. Rather than
The things
Applicants for cards could submit some
relying on the fallible human perception
necessary to
of the information, but the core identity
used in verifying photo-ID cards, an "im-
information on each card would have to be
proved" EEV system would use modern bio-
make a system
tied to a central biometric identity reposito-
metric measuring of each American, such as
like this
ry--probably run by the government. Reliable
by fingerprint readers or iris scanners. Were
biographical information would have to be
every American biometrically registered, the
impervious to
collected and stored by this repository. This
biometric information embedded in their
forgery and fraud
system would deny potential fraudsters the
cards--retrieved from the card, retrieved from
would convert it
ability to submit false information to ID
the human, and compared by machine--
issuers, and it would suppress their frauds.
could provide much stronger assurance to
from an identity
This excursion into an "ideal" employment
verifiers that cards are about the people pre-
system into a
eligibility system shows where internal enforce-
senting them.
cradle-to-grave
ment of immigration law almost invariably
The security of cards against forgery and
leads: to a national, cradle-to-grave, biometric
tampering (the concern raised in the second
biometric
tracking system--a national ID and surveil-
ID-by-card step) can be improved vastly with
tracking system.
lance system. IRCA could be administered
a variety of techniques, especially by using
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