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Illegal immigrants would counterattack

complexities that would burden U.S. workers

in response to the tracking of name-SSN

while weakening EEV's deterrence to illegal

pairs by using original name-SSN pairs with

employment and immigration.

each new hire. EEV would cause illegal aliens

to seek out name-SSN pairs that have not

Counterattack, Response, and Counter-

been used recently in employment. It would

Counterattack

create a bigger criminal market for American

One counterattack on the EEV system that

citizens' personal information.

illegal immigrants would adopt is a mere shift

Since 2005, the Privacy Rights Clearing-

in strategy. Today, many submit false docu-

house has been collecting information about

mentation of plausible names and SSNs for

data breaches that could expose individuals to

the Form I-9 process. This technique would

identity theft.37 Not all of the breaches it

not pass EEV, of course: the name and SSN

must match in the SSA's records.

includes in its study concern both name and

In response, illegal immigrants would

SSN--some have financial account numbers,

adjust their frauds so that they use name and

driver's license numbers, and other key identi-

SSN pairs that match. It is slightly more dif-

fiers--but by late 2007, more than 200 million

ficult to do but easily worthwhile to procure

records had been breached.

Today, identity

"legal" work.

Currently, data breaches rarely result in

fraud creates

To respond to this attack, the EEV system

identity fraud. A June 2007 Government

would monitor the use of name and SSN

Accountability Office report found evidence

financial

pairs. When a name and SSN were used too

of identity fraud resulting from relatively few

difficulties for

breaches.38 Today, victims' family members

often in succession, or in different parts of

innocent victims

the country, the system would "flag" the

and friends, household employees, and finan-

name and SSN pair. Its users would be sus-

cial services personnel with access to sensitive

when they find

pected of fraud, and they would be tentative-

personal information are often the perpetra-

that their finan-

ly nonconfirmed.

tors of identity fraud. By creating new demand

However, this response would have costs.

for name and SSN pairs, EEV would increase

cial reputations

One, of course, is that it requires a federal data-

the value of breached identity data and the

have been sullied.

base that records every new hire in the coun-

rate of identity fraud. The casual criminals

EEV would also

try--yet another of many incremental increases

who now produce fake IDs for illegal immi-

in the tracking of law-abiding Americans.

grants would organize information networks

make them

None of them are terribly objectionable by

to meet the demand for "fresh" names and

unemployable.

themselves, but the totality is quite concerning.

SSNs.

A more immediate cost is that law-abiding

These networks might steal legitimate

citizens would regularly stand accused of

companies' logins and human resources

identity fraud. The SSA and DHS would not

data, enrolling shell companies in EEV to

know which user of a name-SSN pair was the

ping the database for usable sets of identi-

genuine person and which was using a false

fiers. Using the photo-screening tool (dis-

identity. EEV would tentatively nonconfirm

cussed below), they might collect thousands

all users of that name-SSN pair. The "true"

of photos from which each illegal immigrant

individuals attached to fraudulently used

could select the citizen he or she most resem-

identities would learn of identity fraud in

bles to impersonate with forged documents.

their names when they were refused work by

Yet another attack on the EEV system

EEV and plunged into a bureaucratic morass.

would be to corrupt the federal employees

Today, identity fraud creates financial dif-

who handle tentative nonconfirmations. As

ficulties for innocent victims when they find

so often happens in departments of motor

vehicles (DMVs) across the country,39 crimi-

that their financial reputations have been

sullied. EEV would also make them unem-

nals would find federal workers willing to use

ployable.

their access--or fellow workers' logins--to

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