22. Ricks, p. 162.
additional troops from administrative to combat
duties.
23. Sam Rosenfeld and Matthew Yglesias, "The
Incompetence Dodge," The American Prospect,
12. For more on the problems with the expansion,
October 20, 2005.
see Benjamin H. Friedman, "Fewer Missions, Not
More Troops," MIT Center for International
24. Quoted in Richard Lowry, "What Went Wrong?"
Studies, Audit of Conventional Wisdom series,
National Review, October 25, 2004. This is probably
July 2007, web.mit.edu/CIS/pdf/Audit_07_07_
true despite the fact that not all Sunnis were mem-
Friedman.pdf; and Christopher Preble, "Breaking
bers of the Baath Party or employed in the military.
Ranks," American Conservative, March 12, 2007.
25. Hendrickson and Tucker, p. 20.
13. David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker,
"Revisions in Need of Revising: What went Wrong
26. See, especially, Chandrasekaran.
in the Iraq War," Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, December 2005, p. 9.
27. See, for example, Bensahel, pp. 45373; Nora
Bensahel and Anne M. Moisan, "Repairing the
14. Some analysts who claim that a larger force
Interagency Process," Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 44,
may have prevented insurgency in Iraq recognize
(January 2007), pp. 106108; Rathmell, pp. 101338;
this problem and note that a high force level at
and Kenneth R. Dahl, "New Security for New
the outset of the occupation is what mattered.
Threats: The Case for Reforming the Interagency
The idea is that a larger American force could
Process," presented at the 21st Century Defense
have tamped down violence among Iraqis while
Initiative, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Insti-
the government transitioned to the post-Saddam
tution, July 2007, www.brookings.edu/~/media/
era. According to this view, a reformed Iraqi mili-
Files/rc/papers/2007/07defense_dahl/dahl2007073
tary and police force would have prevented anar-
1.pdf.
chy from breaking out as the large American force
withdrew. See especially Pollack. This view puts
28. Robert Gates, Senate Armed Services Defense
undue faith in the ability of Americans to solve
Secretary nomination, Congressional Quarterly,
Iraqi political divisions and in standing up or res-
December 5, 2006. See also Jim Garamone, "Pace
urrecting an Iraqi army. The reason this faith is
Urges Interagency Cooperation in Government,"
misguided is discussed below.
Armed Forces Press Service, August 8, 2007.
15. Quinlivan, pp. 5969. See also Colin F.
29. S/CRS leaders have suggested that their office
Jackson, "Arithmetic of Force? The Use and Abuse
might have been able to salvage the U.S. mission
of Force Ratios in Counterinsurgency" (unpub-
in Iraq. See Justin Logan and Christopher Preble,
lished paper).
"Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against
a Standing Nation-Building Office," Cato Policy
16. Jackson points to various flaws in the method-
Analysis no. 560, January 11, 2006, pp. 2223.
ology that leads to the 20 troops per thousand
benchmark.
30. Murdock et al., Phase 13 Reports.
17. Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-
31. Murdock et al., Phase 1 Report, pp. 5159.
Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2006), pp. 12123.
32. Murdock et al., Phase 1 Report, p. 10.
18. Ricks, pp. 15455; and Rajiv Chandrasekaran,
33. "To meet the national security challenges of
Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green
the future," writes Gen. Peter Chiarelli, senior mil-
Zone (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), p. 74.
itary adviser to the secretary of defense, "we must
create the capacity to engage in the full range of
19. Chandrasekaran, p. 69.
military and interagency operations, and we must
embrace the concept of nation-building, not just
20. Ibid., pp. 6970.
rhetorically, but entirely." Peter W. Chiarelli, with
Stephen Smith, "Learning from Our Modern
21. Ibid., pp. 7071; and Ricks, p. 160. Defenders of
Wars: The Imperative of Preparing for a Danger-
the order, including Bremer himself, often argue
ous Future," Military Review (September/October
that the Iraqi army "disbanded itself." This argu-
2007): 215.
ment, though obviously self-serving, is mostly true.
On Bremer's view, see Peter Slevin, "Wrong Turn at
34. L. Paul Bremer III, "The Road Ahead in Iraq--
a Postwar Crossroads? Decision to Disband Iraqi
and How to Navigate It," New York Times, July 13,
Army Cost U.S. Time and Credibility," Washington
2003.
Post, November 20, 2003.
15