Problems," Testimony before the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabili-
Notes
ties, House Armed Services Committee, March 15,
2006; Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "After the Fight:
1. See especially Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Seven
Interagency Operations," Parameters 35, no. 4
Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq: A Retrospective
(Winter 2005/2006): 4761; Michele Flournoy and
Analysis of the Reconstruction," The Middle East
Shawn Brimley, "In Search of Harmony: Orches-
Review of International Affairs 10, no. 4 (December
trating `The Interagency for the Long War,'" Armed
2006): article 1/7. See also Nora Bensahel, "Mission
Forces Journal, no. 37 (July 2006): 3639.
Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong in Iraqi
Reconstruction," The Journal of Strategic Studies 29,
5. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
no. 3 (June 2006): 45373; and Andrew Rathmell,
and Stabilization, Department of State, www.
"Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq:
state.gov/s/crs/. See also Stephen D. Krasner and
What Can We Learn?" International Affairs 81, no. 5
Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure," Foreign
(October 2005): 101338.
Affairs 84, no. 4 (July-August 2005): 15355.
2. For example, Kurt Campbell and Michael
6. For a review of this literature, see Colin H. Kahl,
O'Hanlon worry that the hangover from Iraq will
"COIN of the Realm," Foreign Affairs (November-
impose constraints on a future administration's
December 2007): 16976.
propensity to launch another war of choice and call
on future leaders "to overcome these constraints
7. James Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability
with a positive new vision and strong leadership,
Operations," Parameters (Winter 1995): 5969. See
rather than allowing them to set the tone for
also James Dobbins, "Who Lost Iraq?" Foreign Affairs
America's future global role." Kurt M. Campbell
86, no. 5 (September-October 2007): 6174.
and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Hard Power: The New
Politics of National Security (New York: Basic Books,
8. Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E.
2006), p. 60. See also Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan,
Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and
"The Next Intervention," Washington Post, August 6,
Occupation of Iraq (New York: Vintage Books, 2007),
2007. On public opinion and the "Iraq syndrome,"
p. 26; Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American
see John Mueller, "The Iraq Syndrome," Foreign
Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press,
Affairs (November/December 2005): 4455.
2006), p. 97; and Michael Isikoff and David Corn,
Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling
3. "A Discussion: Max Boot and Geoffrey Wheat-
of the Iraq War, Library Edition (New York: Crown
croft on American Foreign Policy," New York Times,
Pub-lishers, 2006), p. 194. Gen. Shinseki quoted in
December 18, 2006.
Eric Schmitt, "Army Chief Raises Estimate of G.I.'s
Needed in Postwar Iraq," New York Times, February
4. An incomplete list includes Clark Murdock et al.,
25, 2003.
Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New
Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report (Washington: Center for
9. Ricks, p. 79. See also "Post-Saddam Iraq: The
Strategic and International Studies, 2004); Clark
War Game," National Security Archive, George
Murdock and Michele Flournoy et al., Beyond
Washington University, November 4, 2006, www.
Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB207/inde
for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report (Washington,
x.htm.
DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2005); Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on
10. Barbara Slavin and Dave Moniz, "How Peace
Transition to and from Hostilities, (Washington: Office
in Iraq Became So Elusive," USA Today, July 22,
of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition
2003.
Technology and Logistics, 2004); Transforming for
Stability and Reconstruction Operations, ed. Hans
11. The increase is measured by the difference
Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson (Washington:
from the amount recommended by the Defense
Center for Technology and National Security
Department in its Quadrennial Defense Review,
Policy, National Defense University, 2004); Neyla
not the actual number of troops in uniform.
Arnas, Charles Barry, and Robert B. Oakley,
Since supplemental appropriations passed in
"Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Contin-
recent years to fund the wars allow the army and
gency Operations," Center for Technology and
marines to maintain forces over end-strength by
National Security Policy, National Defense
about 30,000 troops, one could say that the
University (August 2005); Martin Gorman and
increase is really closer to 60,000. The FY 2007
Alexander Krongard, "A Goldwater-Nichols Act for
defense authorization bill, passed prior to the
the U.S. Government: Institutionalizing the Inter-
president's plan, allowed troop levels above the
agency Process," Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 39
QDR figures, meaning that the expansion is
(October 2005): 5158; Michael Vickers, "Imple-
already underway. Another facet of the plan shifts
menting GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency
14