<<  <  >  >>

American security.71 A few civil wars have given

tional wisdom goes, the United States needs

the ability to prop up authority abroad or to

impetus to jihadism, but it does not follow

resurrect it from chaos. That requires boots on

that the United States should join those con-

the ground, civilians to help run foreign gov-

flicts, even in the Middle East. The principal

ernments, and flexible plans for occupation

interest the United States has in lawless states

duties in various cultures and climes. A related

is to prevent a government from taking power

idea says that finding terrorists requires intelli-

that will give refuge to terrorists aiming to

gence, which in turn requires winning hearts

attack our country. The states where such con-

and minds, and therefore the United States has

cerns are valid are few. Afghanistan and Iraq

to find a way to win the entire Muslim world's

are exceptions, not the harbingers of a new

allegiance to defeat terrorism. We must wage,

reality. American actions since September 11

in effect, a "global counterinsurgency."68

should deter governments who might be

tempted to make common cause with anti-

These ideas conflate counterterrorism with

American terrorists. Preventing terrorists from

counterinsurgency, burdening a task we can

gaining sanctuary in weak states does not

accomplish with one we cannot. Counterter-

require that we reinvent our state. We can

rorism is best accomplished by police, intelli-

accomplish the same goals at considerably

gence operatives, and special operations forces.

lower cost through combinations of local

We can hunt and capture or kill the small

allies, intelligence, air strikes, ground raids,

minority of jihadists who seek to attack

and threat of retaliation.

Americans (themselves a small minority of the

The best way to promote American securi-

violent Islamists) but we need not establish

ty is restraint--a wise and masterly inactivity

control over foreign states in order to do so.

in the face of most foreign disorder. We

Nor do Americans need popular support

should resurrect the notion that the best way

abroad to get the intelligence needed to hunt

to spread democracy is to model it. Our ide-

terrorists. Other governments that we ally with

ology sells itself, especially when it is not

do. For example, the snatch-and-grab opera-

introduced at gunpoint or during a lecture to

tions that netted Ramzi bin al-Shibh and

the natives instructing them on how they

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed relied on timely

ought to run their country. Likewise, in the

intelligence and cooperation with Pakistani

officials.69 They were not part of a wider cam-

long term, unplanned free trade and the

wealth it brings may do more to promote sta-

paign to reshape the political and social order

bility abroad than the most careful planning.

in Rawalpindi or Karachi, respectively.

The assertion of raw U.S. power in foreign

Boots on the ground are needed in rare

countries tends to unify our enemies and

cases like Afghanistan to root out terrorist

weaken our ideological allies.

sanctuaries, but, in general, military occupa-

The lessons drawn from the war in Iraq

tions undermine counterterrorism efforts.

Learning the

should include caution about the limits of our

They produce rage and resistance that creates

right lessons

power in remaking states. Iraq should not

enemies and validates the jihadist propagan-

da that America is at war with Islam.70

become a laboratory to perfect the process of

from our

doing so. The fetish for planning, interagency

Occupations convert extremists who would

experience in Iraq

cooperation and counterinsurgency might

otherwise concern themselves with resisting

should convince

produce some worthwhile changes in our

their own governments into international ter-

national security establishment, but it also

rorists interested in killing Americans.

Americans that

might grease our slide into an imperial era

preserving our

foolishly foisted on Americans in the name of

Conclusion

power sometimes

security. Learning the right lessons from our

experience in Iraq should convince Americans

requires

that preserving our power sometimes requires

History is awash in failed states, but only a

restraining it.

restraining it.

handful have posed a serious problem for

13