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Whatever direction it receives from current

in vain for the pages where the author justi-

appointees, our military--with its rotation

fies the creation of an empire and a colonial

service to run it.64 Whatever else changed

schedules, discomfort with subordination to

diplomats and preference for firepower and

after September 11, America remains cultur-

high technology weapons--will struggle to

ally unprepared for imperialism. We are ill-

overcome difficulties with stability operations.

suited for stabilizing disorderly states and

Neither the State Department nor the U.S.

achieving success in protracted foreign wars.

Agency for International Development (US-

A wealth of resources and a dearth of labor

AID), technically part of State, is built to

created an American military that has tradi-

administer an empire. The department's bud-

tionally sought to replace labor with capital,

get is tiny because its aim is to relate to foreign

and to avoid casualties through firepower and

nations, not to run them.

stand-off weapons. Geography left Americans

National security organizations are formed

with a poor understanding of the nations we

by decades of budgets and decisions. Their

might occupy. We also dislike mixing politics

organizational politics may be unfavorable to

and war, which creates a tendency to view war as

a current conception about what American

apolitical and its makers as immaculate techni-

security requires. But these politics reflect

cians, unsullied by the politics they serve.

The State

more lasting national interests, namely a dis-

Americans tend to see war as a substitute for

Department's

diplomacy, not its occasional agent.65 This

inclination to subjugate foreign peoples and

lose unnecessary wars. That disinclination is

approach to war may have its origins in

budget is tiny

not simply accidental but rather derives from

America's uniquely pure liberalism. Americans

because its aim is

the lessons of history that Americans have

dislike limited, non-ideological wars. We want

to relate to

institutionalized. Americans have historically

our wars to be conclusive, the ends clear, the

looked askance at the small wars European

cause righteous, and the force decisive. We favor

foreign nations,

powers fought to maintain their imperial

offense over defense, for it is more decisive.

not to run them.

holdings, viewing those actions as illiberal and

These conditions were spelled out in the

unjust. Misadventures like Vietnam are the

Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, Caspar Weinberg-

exceptions that make the rule. It is no accident

er and Colin Powell's formula intended to help

that U.S. national security organizations are

avoid future Vietnams. The doctrine, articulat-

not designed for occupation duties. When it

ed in the 1980s, called on leaders to prepare

comes to nation building, brokering civil and

overwhelming force, generate strong national

ethnic conflict, and waging counterinsur-

support, define clear objectives, and have a plan

gency, we are our own worst enemy, and that is

for leaving, before using the military.

a sign of our lingering common sense.

These features of the American approach to

The final reason that Americans will not

war militate against success in counterinsur-

gency and state building.66 Our parochialism

master counterinsurgency and state-building

is that we do not have to. Winning small wars

leaves us ignorant of the language and cultures

has never been essential to American security.

of populations that counterinsurgency cam-

That remains the case today. In fact, the

paigns force us to woo. Technology and fire-

attempt to establish control of hostile soci-

power have little utility in such operations,

eties is a source of insecurity.

which are manpower intensive. The insistence

Today both political parties seem to agree

on a rigid dichotomy between politics and war

that the war on terrorism requires an empire.

and aversion to the limited use of force are

Even though they avoid the term, they embrace

destructive to these especially political cam-

the same neoimperial logic with different

paigns, where force should be tightly controlled

twists. The common claim is that terrorists

by civilians. The protracted, defensive nature of

organize and train in places where government

these wars muddies the public's sense of pur-

pose.67 The pressure to use harsh tactics to gen-

authority is limited, like the Taliban's Afghan-

istan. To prevent this outcome, the conven-

erate intelligence offends our moral sense.

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