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Outside

enough troops to go around. A less manpow-

lation protection, it will be less likely to use the

er-intensive solution is to form alliances with

kind of excessive force that alienates people

authorities often

local strongmen who might otherwise be

and empowers insurgencies. Equally impor-

lack the power to

insurgents or aid them, as we see in Iraq's

tant is the COIN manual's focus on political

solve the political

Anbar province, where U.S. forces allied with

institutions and political reconciliation as the

Sunni tribesmen against Al Qaeda-oriented

key measure of success. But the manual's

problems that

militias, and in Afghanistan, where Americans

recognition of this problem merely points to

cause insurgen-

try to split warlords off from the Taliban. This

the limits of COIN doctrine. Outside authori-

solution depends on having a common inter-

ties often lack the power to solve the political

cies, whatever

est with some powerful local actors. Such

problems that cause insurgencies, whatever

their strategy.

common interests will not always exist or may

their strategy. In Iraq, the problem is a dis-

be too shallow to last.

agreement about the distribution of power

This is not to say that U.S. troops cannot

between Iraq's groups. Overthrowing a regime

acquire useful intelligence from foreign popu-

dominated by the Sunni and replacing it with

lations--we gather plenty every day--or that

democracy meant empowering Shiites, so

Americans can never suppress a foreign insur-

insofar as Americans stood for democracy

gency like Iraq's. Nor is it true that American

they were likely to face a Sunni revolt. The

military occupations will never be worthwhile.

problem is one of mathematics more than

Some insurgencies--those less entrenched in

American doctrine. Without a competent cen-

their surroundings--are relatively easy for an

tral state that the various Iraqi groups believed

occupier to destroy. Still, there is no logical

in, counterinsurgency tactics could not assure

reason--no law of politics--that makes even

the survival of a unified Iraq.

the most powerful insurgencies impossible to

One reason to doubt that Americans can

suppress.

ever excel at counterinsurgency is that many

The problem with counterinsurgency

insurgencies present a foreign occupier with

warfare is not that its theory of victory is

nearly insurmountable hurdles. Unfamiliar

illogical. If you understand the culture, if you

with local custom and language, Americans

avoid counterproductive violence, if you inte-

have no independent ability to ferret out insur-

grate civilians and make reconstruction oper-

gents. For intelligence, Americans rely on for-

ations a reward for cooperation, if you train

eign allies and civilian collaborators whom

the local forces well, if you pick your allies

insurgents threaten with death. Unable to

wisely, if you protect enough civilians and

make comparable threats, the American occu-

win their loyalty and more, you might suc-

pier can only bribe, but what bribe can outbid

ceed. But even avoiding a few of these ifs is

the life the insurgent preserves? The popula-

too much competence to expect of foreign

tion will therefore often serve the insurgency

powers. That is why insurgencies in the last

out of fear even if it does not believe in its

century generally lasted for decades and why

cause--and it often does. If the occupying force

the track record of democratic powers pacify-

sits on a town, it may suppress the insurgency,

ing uprisings in foreign lands is abysmal.63

but fighters will slip away or hide. The locals

will likely assume that someday the occupiers

are leaving and that insurgents will again con-

The Empire Strikes Out

trol the streets. The population is therefore

unlikely to provide intelligence even where they

still have useful intelligence to give.62

Another reason Americans will struggle to

master counterinsurgency doctrine is that it

A response to this difficulty is to flood the

requires a foreign policy at odds with our

country with troops, protect citizens, win their

national character. Reading through the pro-

allegiance and crush the insurgency with the

posals for rapidly deployable bureaucrats to

intelligence that is provided. As discussed, in

help run failing states, one usually searches

large countries, there will probably not be

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