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who could then be interrogated for intelli-

Defense --and because of the views of the pres-

gence.54 The result was that in the summer and

ident and his appointees, the prevailing plans

were the most unrealistic ones. The problem

fall of 2003, the U.S. military crowded tens of

was not too little unity but too much.

thousands of captives, many innocent, into

prisons such as Abu Ghraib to be interrogated,

often harshly. Most were subsequently released.

The Counterinsurgency

This pattern angered the Sunni population, dri-

Dodge

ving it further into insurgent arms. Moreover,

having avoided preparation for counterinsur-

gency, the ground services were deficient in the

Another prominent explanation for the fail-

human assets needed to conduct it: officers

ure in Iraq is that the military, the army in par-

with expertise in such wars, Arabic speakers,

ticular, forgot how to fight insurgencies. As in

military police interrogators, and intelligence

Vietnam, the U.S. military initially treated the

officers schooled in the art of gathering infor-

insurgency as a conventional foe and used

mation from men rather than machines.

offensive, high-intensity operations, rather

Responding to these failures, several recent

than population defense, intelligence-gather-

reforms aim to improve American counterin-

ing, and politicking to combat it. The main les-

surgency doctrine and capabilities. In Decem-

son that many army officers drew from

ber 2005, the Pentagon directed the services to

Vietnam was the bureaucratically convenient

make stability operations a priority on par with

notion that politicians should not be allowed to

conventional war.55 Every service, even the navy,

limit wars. After the war, the army was eager to

forget counterinsurgency doctrine and mostly

which is only marginally involved in stability

did. The Marine Corps maintained a greater

operations, now heralds its commitment to

commitment to small wars, but it too has kept

these missions. The army and Marines Corps

conventional conflict as its first priority.

released a new joint counterinsurgency manual

in December 2006.56

This aversion to counterinsurgency brought

failure in Iraq, the logic goes. The army's dis-

Other proposals aim to improve the integra-

dain for occupation duties explains why Gen-

tion of civilians into counterinsurgency and sta-

eral Franks paid so little attention to so-called

bility operations. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, for

Phase IV operations. The notion that such

instance, and several other reports suggest that

duties are not a military job explains not only

Congress create a reserve corps of civilians capa-

the reluctance to reestablish order after

ble of leaving their jobs and being deployed to

help with state-building.57 Kurt Campbell and

Saddam fell, but the failure to secure weapons

depots--which supposedly contained the casus

Michael O'Hanlon recommend the creation of

belli, chemical and biological ordnance--allow-

"a quickly deployable" corps of "Diplomatic

ing insurgents to take all the guns and ammu-

Special Forces" with a "capability large enough

nition they could haul.

to coordinate an effort in a country the size of

Iraq or Afghanistan or even Congo."58 The Iraq

The Bush

The same problem prevented the army from

reacting skillfully to the insurgency. Once the

Study Group proposes that Congress legislate

administration

escalation of violence in 2003 forced the army

to allow agencies to force civilians to serve these

unified decision-

missions.59 The Defense Science Board endorses

to admit that there was a popular Sunni revolt

rather than a few terrorists and dead-ender

Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, where

making in the

Baathists, the reaction was predicable. Al-

civilians are integrated into combatant com-

Department of

mands.60 President Bush endorsed these ideas in

though tactics varied by unit, the army essen-

Defense where the

tially treated the insurgency like a conventional

the 2007 State of the Union address, calling for

the creation of a "Civilian Reserve Corps."61

military foe. This approach amounted to send-

prevailing plans

ing out patrols, sparking firefights where

These changes will probably improve the

were the most

American advantages in firepower would

U.S. performance in counterinsurgency opera-

obtain, and conducting sweeps to net bad guys,

tions (COIN). If the military focuses on popu-

unrealistic ones.

10