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Security Council, and a new office beneath

to claim that the entire interagency process is

broken.27 Had the Department of Defense

this official to coordinate ongoing interagency

activities. It recommends biannual guidance

listened to the Central Intelligence Agency

from the president to organize these affairs,

and State Department, it would have pre-

and a Quadrennial National Security Review

pared ORHA, CPA, and CENTCOM for cer-

to guide the national security bureaucracy just

tain contingencies and avoided those errors.

as the Quadrennial Defense Review supposed-

Had the National Security Council done its

ly guides the Pentagon.32

job, coordination would have been forced on

the agencies.

These proposals are offered as responses to

To many analysts, the lessons of these fail-

failures in Iraq. They are needed, their advo-

ures are clear: improve the American nation-

cates say, to improve our performance in the

al security bureaucracy's ability to plan, and

war against terrorists, which will entail con-

restructure it to heighten coordination. In

tinued counterinsurgency and stability opera-

tions.33 Some of the suggestions are reason-

Washington, calls for fixing the interagency

process to manage stability operations are

able. However, they rely not only on faulty

practically chanted. Top military officers and

premises about Iraq, but also on undue faith

civilian officials, including former chairman

in planning and coordination.

To the extent that

of the Joint Chiefs Peter Pace and current sec-

planning failed,

retary of defense Robert Gates, endorse inter-

Why Better Planning and Coordination

agency reform.28 Think tanks have produced

Wouldn't Have Saved Iraq

it was because

The first problem with the logic that better

various papers in the last three years that pro-

of the Bush

planning would have saved Iraq is that the

pose changes to the national security bureau-

administration's

planning for the war was both plentiful and

cracy to structure the interaction of senior

reasonably prescient. The problem was the

national security officials in Washington,

expectations

willingness to use the plans. The story is well-

facilitate planning in the relevant organiza-

about the war and

documented by James Fallows' Blind into

tions, and ensure cooperation in the field.

Baghdad, Thomas Ricks' Fiasco, Rajiv Chandra-

The State Department has established the

what was needed

sekaran's Imperial Life in the Emerald City, and

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction

to sell it.

Bob Woodward's Plan of Attack. To the extent

and Stabilization (S/CRS) and given it the

lead in future state-building missions.29

that planning failed, it was because of the Bush

administration's expectations about the war

The most prominent proposals come from

and what was needed to sell it. The administra-

the Center for Strategic and International

Studies' Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project.30 The

tion did not entertain plans for a prolonged

occupation, and it saw exercises that envi-

idea is that parochial behavior in federal agen-

sioned one as efforts to undermine the case for

cies and the military services is bad.

war. The right conclusion is not that the

Goldwater-Nichols, legislation that brought

United States national security establishment

joint planning and operations to the Penta-

needs better planning, but that it needs better

gon in 1986, should become the model for the

leaders. That problem is solved by elections,

rest of the national security bureaucracy.

not bureaucratic tinkering.

CSIS's report suggests establishing plan-

Preparation for the war began around

ning offices in the civilian agencies involved

Thanksgiving 2001, when President Bush

in stabilization operations. It calls for annual

asked Gen. Tommy Franks, CENTCOM, to

exercises in which officials practice coordina-

refresh the plan for the invasion of Iraq. Plans

tion and proposes a joint national security

for what came after the invasion were far less

career path, modeled on the military's, which

organized, with scarcely connected efforts

temporarily places civilians in other agen-

cies.31

within the National Security Council, the U.S.

Agency for International Development, State,

The report also calls for a deputy assistant

and various parts of the Department of

for interagency strategies on the National

6