<<  <  >  >>

Had the CPA

given the broad support it enjoyed, especially

staff of the Ministry of the Interior, which

among Iraq's Sunni population.

amounted to a surprisingly high 285,000

retained the army

people . . . and the presidential security units,

and allowed

a force of some 50,000."22

The Poor Planning Fallacy

senior Baathists

However unwise they now appear, both

orders were responses to the demands of

to remain in

Iraq's majority, not American whims.23 The

Conventional wisdom says that the failures

power, we might

United States wanted to avoid the appearance

and errors in judgment just mentioned, as well

of reconstituting a Sunni regime in a country

as many others, can be attributed to poor

have seen a less

filled with ethnic tension and where Shia and

planning. Better plans would have meant a

severe Sunni

Kurds constituted 80 percent of the popula-

larger invasion force, which would have pre-

insurgency and a

tion. Former Bremer aide Dan Senor ex-

vented central authority in Iraq from unravel-

plained that "if we hadn't [moved against the

ing. If it had been operating from better plans,

quicker and more

Baath Party], there may have been severe retri-

the CPA would not have pursued de-Baathifi-

powerful Shi'ite

bution against the Sunnis. And the Shia and

cation so aggressively, and it would not have

insurgency.

Kurds might not have cooperated with us.

let the Iraqi army collapse. It therefore would

Those symbolic steps were very important

not have had to rush to stand up a new army

early on."24 Had the CPA adopted a different

and police force in 2003, forces that were

wholly unprepared to fight. And if success in

course, retaining the army and allowing

Iraq did call for the training of Iraqi troops, a

senior Baathists to remain in power, we might

better plan would not have immediately

have seen a less severe Sunni insurgency and a

assigned their training to overwhelmed Na-

quicker and more powerful Shi'ite insur-

tional Guardsmen but to personnel in the reg-

gency.

ular army and Marine Corps.

Nor is it clear that a reconstituted army

Adequate preparation would have helped

would have been an effective fighting force.

in other ways. The CPA staff would have been

Training and motivation in Saddam's army

larger and more competent (it was initially

was uneven at best, and there is little evidence

staffed by inexperienced Republican Party

that a reconstituted army would have been of

much use in pacifying internal unrest.25 The

loyalists). The Bush administration would

have asked for more funds to rebuild Iraq's

afflictions that have plagued the new Iraqi

infrastructure, and the CPA would have

army--the absence of nationalism to rally

spent them more carefully. With better fore-

diverse troops around, low morale, and dis-

sight, the CPA would not have wasted time

organization--would likely have hindered the

trying to privatize Iraq's economy overnight

old.

rather than getting it on its feet. Had they

It may be that these decisions were crucial

adhered to plans, the CPA would not have

to our subsequent failures in Iraq. A more

formed the Iraqi Governing Council, a group

plausible theory, however, says that the Iraqi

of 25 appointed leaders who helped Bremer

state was in disrepair before the American

rule Iraq prior to nationwide elections. The

invasion and was held together only by the

council not only underrepresented Sunnis

terror of the dictator that we removed.

but reportedly used what resources it con-

Saddam's removal created a competition for

trolled for patronage and theft, discrediting

power that was likely to be settled by arms,

the government and driving Iraqis into the

whatever subsequent decisions the occupy-

arms of militias.26

ing authorities made about the army and the

Baath. It is not the argument here that those

One popular explanation for why the

decisions were wise or that they did not aid in

planning for the occupation failed, the story

the rise of the Sunni insurgency. The point is

goes, is that the government was uncoordi-

that those decisions were not necessary con-

nated and that individual agencies were inca-

ditions for the insurgency to get its legs,

pable of working together; some go so far as

5