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army be established, including three interim

part from cases such as Bosnia, where the sides

divisions to "take over internal security func-

accepted the settlement that the troops

tions as quickly as possible." Although Paul

enforced. There were no insurgents, unlike in

Wolfowitz expressed concern, he ultimately

Iraq. The difference is between enforcing peace

endorsed Abizaid's proposal, which was con-

and making it.

sistent with White House plans.18

Another theory of the insurgency says that

its cause was not disorder but disagreements

War planners also debated what to do with

among Iraq's factions about the governance of

the Baath Party. The State Department and

Iraq and opposition to the presence of an occu-

CIA, according to Washington Post reporter Rajiv

pying force. Far from preventing violence, the

Chandrasekaran, advocated de-Saddamifica-

presence of American troops might have pro-

tion--"purging two classes of Baathists: those

voked it. It is not as if the insurgency grew in

who had committed crimes and those at the

very top of the command structure."19 The

regions where troops were absent and peace

broke out where they were present. Something

Department of Defense favored a broader

closer to the opposite appears to have occurred.

purge that would have prohibited rank-and-

The Iraqi insurgents themselves often point to

file members from holding senior government

the presence of foreign occupiers as the princi-

positions. The National Security Council

pal motivation for their violence.17 If 130,000

attempted to broker a compromise whereby

only the highest ranks of the Baath party,

American troops had little idea how to win the

about 1 percent of its total members, would be

loyalty of Iraq's Sunnis, there is little reason to

removed from office. But Ahmed Chalabi and

believe that another 200,000 would have done

other Iraqi National Congress officials "argued

much better.

passionately that a wholesale purge of the

Baath Party was necessary to demonstrate

Disbanding the Army and

America's commitment to a new political order

in Iraq."20

De-Baathification

Bremer ultimately adopted the position of

Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress.

Beyond the too-few-troops argument, most

Under secretary of defense for policy Douglas

critics of the Bush administration's conduct of

Feith's office drafted a one-and-a-half-page

the occupation point to two other key deci-

executive order, later shown to Wolfowitz and

sions--disbanding the army and de-Baathifi-

Rumsfeld (but not Rice or Powell). Jay Garner,

cation--as crucial missteps that empowered

the outgoing head of the Office of Recon-

the insurgency. These decisions, made at the

struction and Humanitarian Assistance that

start of L. Paul Bremer's tenure as head of the

was being replaced by Bremer's Coalition

Coalition Provisional Authority, deprived Iraq

If 130,000

Provisional Authority, first saw it on May 13.

of managers it needed to run its ministries and

American troops

He was aghast. The order was "too hard, too

government-controlled factories and the secu-

had little idea

harsh," he told Bremer. Garner insisted that

rity personnel it needed to help the Americans

they take the draft to Rumsfeld. Bremer

keep order. More importantly, the orders

how to win the

refused, and issued Coalition Provisional

angered and impoverished Sunni elites and

loyalty of Iraq's

Authority Order Number 1, "De-Baathifica-

soldiers--many of whom made particularly

Sunnis, there is

tion of Iraq Society," on May 16, 2003. The

skilled insurgents.

order purged as many as 85,000 party mem-

These two decisions did not conform to

little reason to

bers from the Iraqi government.21

the original war plans. During the buildup to

believe that

war, the U.S. military anticipated that Iraqi

One week later, on May 23, Bremer enact-

forces would be kept relatively intact. Gen.

ed CPA Order Number 2, "Dissolution of

another 200,000

John Abizaid, who would take over at Central

Entities." This act formally abolished several

would have done

Command (CENTCOM) in the summer of

groups, including "the Iraqi armed forces,

much better.

2003, recommended that a substantial Iraqi

which accounted for 385,000 people; the

4