build a bigger army and Marine Corps. To that
that it was undermanned. The idea is that the
end, the president last year announced a plan
U.S. military stripped Saddam Hussein's
to expand the army by 65,000 soldiers and the
Baathist regime of its monopoly on force in
Marines by 27,000 over five years.11 The expan-
Iraq but failed to fill the resulting power vac-
uum, on account of a lack of troops and will-
sion plan has the support of majorities in both
ingness to police the country. The result was
parties and is slated to become law with the
anarchy. Iraq's tribes and factions within its
passage of the 2008 Defense Authorization
Bill.12 The expansion will take three to five
various ethnic groups armed themselves and
became pseudo governments. Some attacked
years to implement. Given this timeframe, it is
American troops, and some attacked each
justified less by Iraq than by the notion that
other. Disputes broke out over real estate,
fighting terrorism will require other occupa-
and the prospect of being manhandled by
tion and state-building missions that require
rival militias brought still more insecurity,
large numbers of American ground forces.
defensive arming and attacks meant to serve
The idea that more troops could have saved
as self-defense. Beset by violence, the state
Iraq from violent discord is flawed on several
collapsed, and the idea of a unified, multi-
accounts. First, as David Hendrickson and
ethnic country faded.
Robert Tucker argue in a paper prepared for
In a conflict that
To avoid these outcomes, experts say, the
the U.S. Army War College, it would have been
lasts three or five
United States should have sent a far larger
difficult, if not impossible, for the United
occupation force than the 150,000 it had in
States to keep several hundred thousand
years, in a large
troops in Iraq for long.13 Although the United
Iraq when Baghdad fell. A better plan would
country like Iraq,
have two or three times that number, at a ratio
States could have mustered a force level of
the United States
of 20 security personnel per 1,000 of the pop-
400,000500,000 troops temporarily, normal
ulation. Those figures come from a series of
rotation schedules would have required the
cannot maintain
studies published by the RAND Corporation,
troops to return home after being deployed a
a ratio of one
which arrived at a rule-of-thumb for force
year or less. The nation would then have
ratios needed to maintain order based on a
lacked enough replacement forces to maintain
soldier or marine
historical survey of past occupation efforts.7
even close to the 130,000 it kept on hand for
for every 50 civil-
most of the occupation of Iraq, unless it want-
Those ratios are consistent with Central
ians, even with
ed to either prevent troops from rotating
Command's OPLAN 1003-98, the pre-2002
home or rely heavily on National Guard and
contingency plan for war with Iraq, which
a significantly
Reserve units, both politically dicey proposi-
called for 380,000 troops, and the now famous
larger military.
tions likely to damage morale. The more
suggestion from Army Chief of Staff Eric
troops sent in initially, the fewer can remain
Shinseki that "something on the order of sev-
indefinitely. In a conflict that lasts three or five
eral hundred thousand soldiers" would have to
occupy Iraq.8 One army brief on reconstruc-
years, in a large country like Iraq, the United
States cannot maintain a ratio of one soldier
tion issues took account of the army's experi-
or marine for every 50 civilians, even with a sig-
ence in Bosnia and Kosovo and estimated that
nificantly larger military.14
a comparable mission in Iraq would require
approximately 470,000 troops.9 President
The second and more fundamental prob-
Bush's National Security Council appears to
lem with the idea that more boots on the
have come up with the highest number. A
ground would have prevented Iraq's insur-
memo drafted in Feb-ruary 2003 suggested
gency is that the way troops are employed
matters more than their number.15 History
that, if historical precedent were followed,
500,000 troops would be needed to stabilize
holds examples of small numbers of troops
and rebuild Iraq.10
pacifying large populations and large num-
bers of troops failing to pacify small popula-
The idea that high troop levels were essen-
tions.16 The 20 troops per 1,000 civilians ratio
tial to success in Iraq and other stability oper-
ations has an obvious policy implication:
for policing populations abroad is drawn in
3