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What prevents

American leaders are saying, we will have a

Introduction

national security bureaucracy capable of imple-

stability in Iraq

menting our policies; next time, in other words,

is not American

we will get it right.

There is a strange consensus developing

policy but

The consensus is wrong and dangerous.

among American foreign policy experts about

What Iraq demonstrates is a need for a new

the war in Iraq. Most agree that the war will

the absence of a

national security strategy, not better tactics

not have been worthwhile, whatever precari-

political solution

and tools to serve the current one. By insist-

ous success American forces can still achieve.

ing that there was a right way to remake Iraq,

Despite that failure, foreign policy experts in

to the communal

we ignore the limits on our power that the

both parties mostly agree that with better

and sectarian

enterprise has exposed and we risk repeating

planning, more troops, better counterinsur-

divisions there.

our mistake. Deposing Saddam Hussein was

gency doctrine, and more cooperation among

relatively simple. Creating a new state to rule

U.S. government agencies, Iraq could have

been stabilized.1 The experts fear, however,

Iraq was nearly impossible, at least at a rea-

sonable cost. What prevents stability in Iraq

that Iraq will sour Americans on future inter-

is not American policy but the absence of a

ventions--that an "Iraq syndrome" will pre-

political solution to the communal and sec-

vent the United States from embarking on

future state-building missions.2 To most

tarian divisions there. Our invasion exposed

those rifts but their repair is beyond our

experts, this syndrome would be dangerous.

power. Maybe the United States can improve

For even if Iraq is lost, the consensus view says,

its ability to manage occupations, but the

the war on terrorism will require the United

principal lesson Iraq teaches is to avoid them.

States to repair failed states, lest they spawn

Not all state-building missions pose the chal-

terrorism.

lenges Iraq does, but most of these missions

To analysts who share these views, Iraq is

are extremely costly, most of them fail, and

not an example of what not to do but of how

most of them corrode American power.

not to do it. It is an experiment that teaches

This paper shows that the conventional

Americans lessons about how to manage for-

explanations for why we have failed to achieve

eign populations. Based in part on these

our stated aims in Iraq nearly five years after

lessons, Washington is reforming the national

the war began--poor governmental planning

security bureaucracy to make it a better servant

and coordination in preparing for the occupa-

of a strategy that requires military occupations,

tion, too few troops, and misconceived coun-

state-building, and counterinsurgency opera-

terinsurgency doctrine--cannot explain the

tions--what the military calls reconstruction

and stabilization.3

persistent violence in Iraq. We also discuss why

there are limits to what planning, coordina-

To that end, the president and Congress

tion, and counterinsurgency doctrine can

recently agreed to expand the size of our

accomplish in war. We conclude by noting

ground forces in the hope that our next inter-

that because there are few good reasons to

vention will not fall short of troops. Think

take on missions meant to resuscitate failed

tanks across the ideological spectrum busy

governments, terrorism notwithstanding, we

themselves with plans to improve the coordi-

should not much lament these limits on

nation of national security agencies for the

American power.

next occupation and to prepare diplomats, sol-

diers, and bureaucrats to staff it.4 A new state-

building office in the State Department draws

The Size of the

up plans for ordering various failed or unruly

states.5 An array of defense experts offer advice

Occupation Force

on counterinsurgency doctrine and insist that

the military services embrace it.6 The services

Perhaps the most common complaint

say that they already have done so. Next time,

about the American occupation of Iraq is

2